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PREFACE
Japanese foreign policy is now in a period of transition.
Shifts in the international system and new political respon-

sibilities

bom

of the growing Japanese impact on the world

indicate a new role in world politics.

The nature of that

role is the subject of this study.

Foreign policy is the product of both a domestic process
of choice and externally defined constraints.

During the

post-war period Japan's domestic politics, especially national
party politics, have been closely linked with the resulting
foreign policy.

However, Japan's foreign policy has been and

continues to be uniquely bounded by external constraints.

The

dynamics of world politics determine the outer limits within

which the domestic foreign policy-making process

is carried

out.

As the title suggests this study deals with but one

piece

-

the external setting

-

of a larger puzzle, and it is

not meant to be a comprehensive analysis of the contemporary
Japanese foreign policy picture.

The purpose of this study

is to identify important aspects of the Japanese foreign policy

context and on the basis of the emerging patterns, to propose
general statements of the limitations on choice

-

therefore to

V1H
indicate the effect of the changing international system on

Japanese options for the future.

This is done through an

analysis of (I) the nature of the international system,
relations between Japan and the West,

Japan and the major powers in Asia,

(II)

(III) relations between

(IV) the growing impact

of relations between Japan and the developing nations of South

East Asia, and (V) the defense and security problem.

Chapter

VI suggests the limits placed on an emerging international
role on the basis of the previous chapters.

^
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CHAPTER

1

THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM

The use of the international system in foreign policy anal-

ysis is a device intended to make sense out of an often complex
set of forces occurring simultaneously and in many directions.

Although there is danger of attributing a pattern to international politics which does not exist, use of the international

system as a frame of reference does make it possible to propose general statements about the effect of the changes in

international behavior on foreign policy options, in other
words, how foreign policy is bounded by the global political
structure.
nized.

Nations interact in patterns which can be recog-

These patterns, once understood, can be used to make

general statements of the balance between the inevitable impact of systemic forces and the remaining area of policy choice
This notion of middle-range systems theory is used in the works

of Raymond Aron and Stanley Hoffmann, the latter of whom des-

cribes its usefulness in the following terms.

Systemic analysis is possible only at a certain level of abstraction, and its usefulness
resides in its capacity to indicate the limits
of determinism and areas of effective free
action.

Hoffmann , Gulliver's Troubles, Or the S etting of
American Foreign Policy (New York; McGraw-Hill Book Company,
f Stanley

1968), p. 12.

2

.

2

Despite the growing impact of transnational forces
states
are the most important units of the international
system.

In

his study of models of foreign policy analysis, Graham
Allison

describes the advantages of the state-centric or classical

model
The contribution of the classical model to our
explanation, prediction and analysis of foreign
affairs is considerable.
This lens reduces the
organization and political complications of a
government to the simplification of a single

actor

.

The major factors of analysis of systems theory as des-

cribed here are international power and security, thus the

ability of a state to achieve its goals in a competitive inter-

national system and protect itself from conflicting goals of
other nations.

The basic argument of this chapter is that

Japan must shape its foreign policy according to the limits
imposed by the international system.
to some extent of every country.

This is undoubtedly true

The argument, therefore, is

contingent upon the establishment of Japan's unique dependence
on the external setting.

The idea that Japan has a unique

foreign policy setting will be developed throughout the study,
but it should be noted here that:

(1)

Japan has an unusual im-

balance in economic, military and political power;

(2)

Japan

Allison, Essence of Decision, Explaining the
Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1971), p. 252.
2 Graham T.

.
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has a tremendous impact on the global economy;

(3)

Japan lacks

a well-defined regional alliance or natural group of support-

ers; and (4) because of its economic structure, Japan must

deal with a broad cross-section of nations throughout the

world.

These factors suggest that Japan cannot avoid being

woven into and directly affected by the evolving pattern of
the international system, for it has no buffer to ease the

shock of external changes

West Germany, a country often compared with Japan since

World War II, has recovered under quite different circumstances
as a member of NATO and the Common Market, and has therefore

been able to tie her security to the defense of the Western

world and her economic development to a strong regional economy.

Having neither of these options, Japan has become the

stepchild of the world, whose geographical, cultural and historical ties with Asia conflict with economic, security and

ideological ties with the West.

Such isolation from strong

links to any one group of nations explains Japan's unique

vulnerability to shifts in the international system.

A recognizable pattern has emerged in Japanese foreign
policy statements, which almost without exception pay heed to
the extreme importance for Japan of the external constraints

4

on policy.

A recent Ministry of Foreign Affairs White Paper

is a typical example.

Needless to say, Japan's national interests are
largely dependent on the peace and prosperity
of the world.
Japan has been able to acquire
its national power of today, despite its small
land, dense population and limited natural
resources, because there has been no largescale war in the world and because it has been
able to lie in peace and to share in prosperity
with other countries through a system of free
economic interchange. For Japan to achieve
the construction of a peaceful and affluent
society, which it hopes for, there must be,
first of all, a peaceful and prosperous international society.^
The tendency to mention external prerequisites for Japan's con-

tinued success is more than platitude for it indicates the

Japanese perception that their foreign policy is first and
foremost bounded by the nature of the international climate.

The Cold War International System

The outside world Japan faced in the 1950 's and early

1960 's was a clearly defined bipolar system of ideological,

economic and political division between the West, centered
around the power of the United States, and the group of nations
linked to the Soviet Union.

Since the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.

emerged from World War II as the only major powers, tensions
Institute of International Affairs, White Papers
of Japan 1971-1972 (Tokyo: Japan Institute of International
Affairs, 1973), p. 34.
5 japan

5

built in the regions bordering the two power blocs,
notably
Europe and East Asia.

Although there are conflicting theories

explaining the origins of the cold war, the fact remains that

national security became the most immediate foreign policy goal
of most states.

Alliance with one of the two cold war camps

was almost a foregone conclusion since the U.S. and U.S.S.R.

were the only two guarantors of security, as well as the two

major sources of economic aid and political support.

Neutral-

ity was a difficult path to follow in the 1950's, strengthening
the cohesion of each camp.

The structure of relations was

driven by confrontation and global tension, but its major char-

acteristic was stability, since there were limited possibilities
for shifting alliances or multiple coalitions.

In sum there

was little room for diplomatic maneuver outside the framework
of the cold war coalitions.

Seyom Brown describes the cold

war international system in similar terms.

"National security

was so dependent on the cohesion of one's coalition that the

coalition itself tended to be regarded as an end rather than
^
a means. u4

Since cold war rivalry spread to all sections of the globe,

Asian regional foreign policies were subordinate to the larger

4Seyom Brown, New Forces In World Politics (Washington,
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1974), p. 9.

"
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stakes represented by the big-power struggle.

The U.S. efforts

to contain China and limit Soviet influence
in East Asia led

to an American presence in Asia which,

for practical purposes,

eliminated the possibility of a grossly divergent Japanese
foreign policy, especially given the instability on the Korean

peninsula and the hostility of the Sino-Soviet coalition.

Con-

sidering the seven year occupation of Japan, the continued oc-

cupation of the Ryukyu and Ogasawara Islands, and the widespread resentment in East Asia of a half century of Japanese

imperialist policy, it is little wonder that Japan consistently

pursued a low posture foreign policy, especially during the two
decades of the "classical cold war."^

Most analysts of Japanese foreign policy during this
period dwell upon the close relationship with the United States.

Donald Hellmann used the following metaphor- "The alliance with

America has served as an international incubator.
-

.

.

.

"^

implying that Japan was unable to pursue successfully its

foreign policy goals and therefore that an independent and thus
However, if a

satisfactory foreign policy was out of reach.

^This term refers to the extreme bipolar system of the
1950's and implies that the cold war continues, but in a different form.
6Donald Hellmann, "The Confrontation with 'Realpolitik
ed. by James
in Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970 's
Press,
University
1972), p. 137.
Princeton
Morley (Princeton:
,

'

,

"
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successful foreign policy is measured by the ability
to achieve

desired goals, by making choices among available
alternatives,
then Japan

s

postwar foreign policy can only be judged a

smashing success.

It is the compatibility of the cold war

stability and open economic system with Japan's goal of economic recovery which should be stressed.

Japan depended on

the United States for national security, avoided cold war ten-

sions by leaving to the U.S. considerations of ’high politics.'

and concentrated on building ties with the world economic sys-

7

tem by means of a further policy of the separation of politics

and economics.

This strategy was able to make use of the pre-

vailing international system to Japanese advantage.

Thus,

the

relevant fact of the 1950's and early 1960's was the range of
choice open to Japan in building the foundation of its eco-

nomic miracle, rather than the seemingly excessive constraints
on policy in other areas.

7Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles , p. 404. High politics
is defined as "vital interests of national diplomacy and
strategy." Part of Japan's foreign policy problem is that many
nations now consider economic issues to be within the scope of
This trend compromises Japan's broad range of
high politics.
Also see Hellmann, "The Confrontation
relations.
economic
with 'Realpolitik' ," p. 136, in which the author characterizes
high politics as "power and prestige" with a decided "military
dimention
.
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The Present International System
If the twenty-year period following the second
world war

was a time of bipolarity, superpower dominance, and the
supreme importance of security issues in a relatively stable

international system, the 1960's saw a breakup of the cold

war structure and the introduction of new forces in inter-

national relations which greatly altered Japan's range of
foreign policy choice.
The realization by the United States and the Soviet Union

that no victor was possible if brinksmanship and confrontation

led to war, was a major cause of a relaxation of tensions.

For the first time since 1945 the two nations acted jointly
on a recognized mutual interest

-

that of survival.

It became

obvious that competition would have to shift to other planes.
As the superpowers grappled with the complexities of nuclear

weapons control, the salience of the previously dominant security issue began to wane.
The Sino-Soviet split also had an important effect on the

dilution of the classical cold war international system.

Not

only did Soviet-American tension slacken as a result of theoretically unuseable nuclear weapons, but one of the two
coalitions began to fracture.

These forces undermined the

very rationale for coalition solidarity.

The climate for a

9

new flexibility in foreign policy choices was perceived by
middle and small states as they saw that the tremendous military power held by the superpowers was in fact a handcuff to

flexible action, and that the international political scene

was becoming more complex and ripe for diplomatic innovation.
Cold war positions were often defined and expressed in

ideological terms.

Although there were some exceptions,

ideology was the cement which held the two superpower coalitions
together.

Building socialism in the East and strengthening the

free world in the West became phrases designed to subordinate

national policy to the broader goals of the East or West, goals
with more import than narrow national interest.

As the pre-

dominance of security issues began to be challenged by nonsecurity issues supported by coalitions of lesser powers, so
too did ideological solidarity begin to moderate.

As issues

such as economic development, the food crisis, and energy

needs

-

-

issues which tend to cut across ideological planes

began to frequent diplomatic agendas, superpowers became less

and less able to define the structure of world politics.

In

1968 Henry Kissinger wrote of the United States, and by im-

plication the Soviet Union, that: "The United States

is no

has to
longer in a position to operate programs globally; it

encourage them.

It can no longer impose its preferred solu-

10

tion,

it must seek to evoke it."

As the constraints on foreign

policy were reduced, the agendas of international
diplomacy

began to reflect the needs of many nations instead
of the military confrontation of only two.
In 1972 the changing nature of the cold war was
indicated

by an American President in Moscow and Peking, both visits
in
the same year, as well as the visit of the Soviet party chief
to Washington in 1973.

Detente, or the easing of tensions

between nations, characterizes the present state of superpower
relations, although it is more of an international atmosphere
than a solution to root problems.
The new flexibility in international affairs was a signal
to design more independent policies reflecting more narrowly

defined national interests.

Third world coalitions appeared

in defiance of both superpowers, and new regional groups began

forming to achieve stronger economic and political bargaining
power.
zen.

Japan's politics, on the other hand, seemed to be fro-

Few initiatives came from Tokyo in response to the newly

flexible international system.

In fact it is this flexibility

which carried with it new problems
opportunities.

-

dangers as well as new

But it was clearly the dangers inherent in the

Policy, Three Essays
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1969), p. 93.

%enry Kissinger, American Foreign

^
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new international power relationships which shaped Japan's reaction.

By the late 1960

s

it was obvious that the superpowers

could no longer be responsible for a broad range of national
policies.

The spreading of international power demanded that

Japan begin to formulate independent foreign policy positions
in many areas such as trade,

foreign aid, and regional politics.

The opportunities for renewed nationalism created a dilem-

ma for Japan which remains at the center of her foreign policy
today.

It is well described by Henry Kissinger.

We are in a period of relaxation of tensions.
But as the rigid decisions of the past two
decades diminish, new assertions of national
identity and national rivalry emerge.

Toward such an international environment Japan could only be
ambivalent.

On the one hand, the growing desire to achieve

international prestige appropriate to its important place in
the global economy was a centrifugal force propelling Japan

into the international arena.

However, exposure to new forms

of national rivalry presented clear dangers to the achieve-

ment of Japan's other goals of security and continued economic
growth.

The relaxation of international tensions brought with

it a less stable system in which more rapid shifts in alliances

and coalitions could take place.

Such shifts were not con-

gruent with Japan's desire for a firm pattern of international
^New York Times, April 24, 1973.

.
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relations on which to base long-term economic relationships.
Therefore Japan began to espouse a philosophy of internationalism as a means of coping with newly independent sources of
power.

Internationalism would insulate Japan from increasingly

nationalistic, and regional, politics averse to global economic
intercourse, and was thus a natural response to the external

setting

A closer look at the present international system reveals
the following general patterns.
(1)

Bipolarity continues to describe the military superi-

ority of the United States and the Soviet Union.

In a serious

military confrontation, these two superpowers are the only
nations that matter.

This fact continues to influence the over-

all pattern of international relations, though not as directly
as it did during the early cold war.
(2)

The loosening of the bipolarity in recent years has

brought about more assertive, independent policymaking from
middle and lower powers, or multipolarity.

The movement of

international politics is now determined by an increasing number of power centers combining in more complex and less pre-

dictable patterns.

Multipolarity, or the distribution of power

content
to a greater number of actors, is assigned a political

militarily
by Kissinger, who wrote of "a world which is bipolar

H
13

and multipolar politically.

.

.

."10

Equally valid is Stanley

Hoffmann's military conception of multipolarity
whereby nuclear

proliferation spreads out military poker chips once
held by
only two players.
(3)

As corollary to multipolarity, superpowers can
no

longer define international problems in their own terms.

The

United States and the Soviet Union are unable to solve economic
problems without the participation of other nations in finding
a solution.
(4)

The critical interaction of the international system

is the U.S.-U.S.S.R.-P.R.C.

triangle, which includes a) U.s.-

U.S.S.R. bipolar underpinning in a period of detente, b) Sino-

Soviet hostilities which show no signs of easing, c) U.S.P.R.C. rapprochement which is fueled by b).
(5)

Due to the new centers of independent power, there

were indications, especially during the Nixon presidency, of
an emerging balance of power system.

In July 1971, Nixon spoke

of the international political interplay among five major
powers: the United States, the Soviet Union, the People's

Republic of China, Western Europe and Japan.

The Nixon-

Kis singer foreign policy was inclined to eschew permanent

l^Kissinger American Foreign Policy p. 85.
llHoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles p. 43-46.
,

,

,

.
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alliances in favor of a shifting balance.
a balance of power system, however,

nations.

is a

One prerequisite for

homogeneous group of

Of the above mentioned, one is not a nuclear power

and one is not even a nation.

Also, there still exist unre-

solved ideological differences which will continue to define

foreign policy goals and preclude the operation of a balance
of power system.
The tendencies toward the balance of power, however limited, have been an irritant to Japan.

A nation with a philos-

ophy of internationalism and global interdependence would have
to reject the notion of a "mechanical balance. "12

The Japanese

position on this issue is revealed in a government policy state-

ment

.

side will also gauge
correctly Japan's capabilities and the wishes
of its people and, instead of being carried
away by the simple, so-called theory of the
balance of power, will act in such a way as to
truly meanmake its relations with its allies
1 O
J
ingful in the multi-polar age.
It is hoped that the U.S.

The complexity of the world today makes it difficult to

arrive at conclusions as to the nature of the international

system and its effect on Japanese foreign policy.

What is

12Masataka Kosaka, Options for Japan's Foreign Policy
Adelphi Paper No. 97 (London: International Institute for
Strategic Studies [hereafter IISS] 1973), p. 40.
12j a pan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers
,

p

.

36

,
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clear is that the bipolar confrontation which
gave definite
shape to world politics in the post-war era
has dissipated.

New forces in world politics can be identified,
but there is
no dominant structure.

The world is now in a transitional

period in which an increasingly powerful third world,
an influential group of oil producing nations, a newly assertive
group of middle powers, and new constraints on superpower dominance, have combined to set in motion a process of adjustment,

but to what end it is difficult to foresee.

The absence of a

dominant international structure is extremely important to
Japan.

The uncertainty in the world makes it difficult for

Japan to carry out its foreign policy with assurance.
The fluid, undefined nature of international relations

has led all nations, not just Japan, to grope for some "agreed

concept of order.

But whereas many nations are now fur-

thering their own interests by the hardening of national boundaries and the assertion of national power, Japan's interest
lies in the formation of a lasting global system of interdepen-

dent parts less prone to the pitfalls of uncertain rivalry.

Multipolarity is the international trend from which the
specific Japanese foreign policy dilemma arises.

During the

classical cold war period Japan adjusted to the external setting by signing the Security Treaty with the United States.
•^Kis singer. American Foreign Policy

,

p.

57.
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Japan dealt politically with the outside world
through that

relationship.

Multipolarity means that Japan must now inter-

act politically with many centers of power.

Since these power

centers often collide, or at least advocate contradicting
policies, Japan is forced to make decisions which, while
favorable to some nations, are unfavorable to others.
As the foreign policy of most nations is gradually shift-

toward the economic area, Japan's foreign policy is under-

going a change in the opposite direction.

This process has

been described as the unavoidable return to the Realpolitik of

international politics.

15

It is true that the necessity of

making independent foreign policy decisions in a multipolar
period draws Japan into the flow of international politics.
The real issue is not whether Japan will assume a more integra-

tive role in world affairs politically as well as economically,

but what the nature of that role is to be.
The following excerpt from a Japanese Ministry of Foreign

Affairs White Paper describes the importance of the external
setting in narrowing the available foreign policy options.
In other words, multipolarization enables Japan
to expand the range of its diplomatic activities
more than ever before and to have diverse options.

Japan and East Asia, The New Inter national Order (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1972), p. xi.
15 Dona Id

Hellmann

,

17

It is also clear that, on the other hand,
is required to take even more prudent

Japan
and responsible action to meet international expectations
and trust, [emphasis added 16
]

The Nature of International Power

A critical aspect of the emerging international system
is a change in the nature of international power
and the way

it is applied.

The previous analysis suggests that Japan will

have to deal with the external environment on the basis of its
own independent resources and less as an ally of the United
States.

Japan's role in world politics will depend largely

upon how it chooses to accomplish its goals, and these decisions are in turn shaped by the changing nature of interna-

tional power.
In the cold war of the immediate post-war period, power

was still a function of military capability.

Policy was often

a direct calculus of strategic position and relative military

strength, as well as related factors of technology and natural

Now the superpowers are left with a devalued cur-

resources.

rency of power.

Brute force is no longer the only or the most

prominent method of settling disputes or improving international
prestige.

New forms of power have complemented, and in some

cases replaced, the old.
lb japan

p

.

34.

The use of power in peacetime has

Institute of International Affairs, White Papers

,

.

18

become much more important. 17

However, its new complexity ren-

ders it difficult to describe or measure,
and more difficult to
use diplomatically. 18

The more abstract character of power
in

a multipolar era led one analyst to lament
that "because the

new factors of power are complex and varied, their
playing has
3-

flexibility that seems to defy analysis." 1 ^
We can begin to untangle the difficult notion of power
by

noting that it is a relational concept, not something which
can
have meaning independently of an external referent.
not be stored for use at any time.

Power can-

U.S. ammunition stockpiles,

once so able to influence the actions of others by use or threat
of use, now hold little of their original value.

The weapons

can do the same physical damage, but because of a change in the

external context, they no longer achieve the same political
results
At a time when multipolarity thrives and interdependence

and cooperation are at least recognized as fruitful, if not

necessary, paths to the solution of international ills, Japan's

international position has been enhanced.

This is often atrib-

uted to the 'economic miracle', but of greater significance

is

the manner in which Japan's economy is linked to the outer

world.

From this vantage point the broadranging interdependence

17 Hoffmann,

Gulliver's Troubles

,

p.

18 Kissinger, American Foreign Policy
1 9Hoffmann,

32.
,

p.

Gulliver's Troubles, p. 35.

62.
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of Japan's economy with the rest of the world and the need for

international cooperation are key factors.
The present international system indicates that:

will be most effectively expressed in peacetime,

(2)

(1)

power

economic

bargaining chips are becoming more important relative to military capability, and (3) heightened influence will fall to

countries with diverse contacts crossing many state and regional lines.

Japan's position coincides favorably with these

general statements of international power; it is mainly these

external changes which account for the status of present-day
Japan.

Had the conditions of the early cold war continued,

Japan would not have achieved its present importance in inter-

national affairs, in spite of its economic strength.

It is not

economic strength alone but its combination with a particular

international system which gives it value.

Seyom Brown puts it

this way.
In the new system the most influential countries
are likely to be those that are major constructive participants in the widest variety of

coalitions and joint or multilateral ventures,
since they would have the largest supply of useable political currency- in effect, promissory
notes for support on one issue in return for
support on another. ^0
feasible, it
Since traditional forms of power are no longer

is

international
these new, more abstract types which will define
^bBrown. New Forces

,

p.

112-113.
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power, and which are important to keep in
mind when thinking

about Japan's increasing international activity.
Japan's important place in international affairs
is often

mistakenly equated with international power, resulting
in misguided calculations of the possible Japanese role in
world
politics.

That Japan is a "major constructive participant"

in a great variety of bilateral and multilateral activities

cannot be denied.

But this has brought with it greater vulner-

ability and added burdens to Japan which do not necessarily
increase its ability to achieve desired goals.

It does, how-

ever, compel Japan to accept new international responsibilities.
The concept of 'importance'

is

more applicable to Japan's

position, although importance is not synonymous with power.

Japan's post-war, low-key foreign policy was successfully de-

signed to avoid the necessity of making difficult political
choices detrimental to the growth of the economy.

The foreign

policy dilemma today stems from the more frequent requirement
of making just such decisions, unavoidable due to Japan's

importance in the world, but dangerous because of a dearth of

political currency to support such actions.
The fact that the enhanced importance of Japan to inter-

national affairs weakened its foreign policy, suggests that
Brown's discussion of the new forms of international power must

21

be altered in Japan

s

case.

Postwar foreign policy has con-

centrated on building the economy.

Since efforts were made

to separate political matters from the negotiations Japan was

involved in, Japan did not develop the political currency to

which Brown alludes.

Negotiations have not treated economic

packages as components of a larger political framework.

Lacking political bargaining chips, Japan's role as a major
constructive participant in a wide variety of international

relationships has created a serious vulnerability to external

political pressures.
In order to achieve its goals, Japan has also expected

much of the international environment

-

relative international

stability, free access to the purchase of natural resources,
an open economic system, and the latitude to continue economic

relations, even with nations opposed to each other.

Japan

must do all in its power to insure the continuation of these
conditions.

However, Japan has deemphasized the use of inde-

pendent political leverage, in order to protect the wide range
of economic relations it now enjoys.

Raymond Aron noted that

"Switzerland and Sweden, which have virtually no desire or

possibility of influencing the thought or action of other
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nations, are less vulnerable to foreign pressures "21
.

Just the

opposite applies to Japan.
This consideration of international power suggests that

Japan will not be able to pursue successfully a role in world

politics supported by the conventional understanding of power
Japan is uniquely situated to develop a new type of

politics.

international power based not on nuclear weapons or traditional
alliances, but on international cooperation, global economic

interdependence and the intangible moral force of a potential

nuclear power renouncing that path to global influence.

Also

suggested here is that it may be premature to speak of Japan
as a

'superpower' or even as a 'major power'.

is unique

-

Japan's position

a nation whose advanced economy affects global

trends, but a nation unable as yet to effectively use this

economic power to achieve other political goals.

2lRaymond Aron, Peace and War, A Theory of Int ernational
and
Relations an abridged version trans by Richard Howard
55.
Annette Baker Fox (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1973), p.
.

,
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CHAPTER

II

JAPAN AND THE WEST

The United States

The sensitivity of Japan’s foreign policy to external

stimuli is nowhere more evident than in the relationship with
the United States.

The United States was the dominant figure

in Japan's international environment by offering economic

concessions, political support for such goals as reentry into
the United Nations, and a security guarantee.

The political

and military support continue, although a new interpretation

must now be attached to each, due to changes in international
politics.

The post-war economic relationship which lasted

two decades was initiated only after the United States recog-

nized that growing cold war tensions placed new value on an

economically strong, democratic ally in East Asia.

In fact,

the nature of the whole relationship was shaped more by the

U.S. confrontation with the P.R.C. and the U.S.S.R. than by

an intrinsic friendship between Japan and the United States.

Even President Kennedy's notion of 'partnership' with Japan,

and the accompanying economic support for Prine Minister
Ikeda's domestic economic growth plans, was motivated by the

need to strengthen the American footing in Asia because of

2

24

renewed cold war tensions.^

-

Furthermore, continued economic support was destined
to
end once the faltering U.S. economy was directly
affected by

Japan

s

economic success.

Despite the new rivalry, largely

economic in nature, the United States remains a central
focus
of Japanese foreign policy.

This importance is likely to re-

main, even if Japanese-American ties are significantly loosened,

because American decisions in Asia, and on global economic matters, will always have a direct effect on Japan.

Nearly 307o

of Japan’s total imports and exports are carried out with the

United States, which is a block of trade not easily replaced
or duplicated elsewhere.

When Prime Minister Miki addressed the Diet after assuming
office, he noted his understanding of the relationship with the

United States.
There is no change in our basic policy though
the cabinet has changed.
There is no change
in the fact that the maintenance and strengthening of Japan-U.S. friendly relations represent the pivotal part of Japan's diplomacy.
This statement could have been made by any of the post-war prime

ministers, although this does not mean that important changes in

Japanese-American relations have not occurred which affect the
Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1973), p. 55.
2 Japan Report
"Gist of Prime Minister Miki's Speech,"
January 16, 1975, p. 3.
.C

.

,
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range of choice open to Japanese foreign policy.

On the con-

trary, it is proof of the importance of the U.S. to Japan,

that in spite of the shockwaves which have been felt on either
side of the Pacific, Japan would still recognize what it per-

ceives to be an overriding national interest in a relationship

with the United States.
Emerging competition

.

A symbolic milestone was passed in

1965 when, for the first time, the customary U.S. advantage in
the bilateral balance of trade shifted to favor Japan.

Japan

was becoming important to the United States, not merely as a

supply depot for Asian military operations, but by having a
direct impact upon the health of the American economy.

Japan

lacked the diplomatic and political strength to use this new

importance to the United States to best advantage.

Conse-

quently, instead of buttressing its ability to achieve foreign

policy goals, the outcome of Japan's overwhelming economic
growth was to trigger in the United States a reevaluation of

certain aspects of the alliance.
In a foreign policy report issued to Congress in February,

1972, President Nixon stressed that the Japanese dependence

upon the United States must change.
This relationship stands out as a major success
Its purpose was
of American postwar diplomacy.
required
security
and
to provide the sustenance
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for economic and psychological recovery from
the trauma of World War II.
That recovery is
complete.
Our relationship now requires
greater reciprocity. 3
.

.

.

Once the international system became more flexible, and Japan's

economy provided competition for U.S. markets, there was no

alternative to a fundamental rethinking of the Japanese-

American relationship in both Washington and Tokyo.
Much of the problem centered around an imbalance in the
alliance, which was bound to cause friction.

During the clas-

sical cold war period such an imbalance was accepted.

After

Japan emerged as an important economic power, this imbalance
could no longer play a constructive role.
Symbolic of the emerging competition, the textile crisis
was the first important issue on which negotiations broke down
in stalemate.

In 1970 textiles were 12.570 of total Japanese

exports and represented 10.1% of the exports to the United
States

The U.S. textile industry, Southern-based and weak-

ened due to growing competition from Hong Kong, South Korea,
Taiwan, as well as Japan, was able to extract from Nixon a
Foreign Policy for the 1970's, The Emerging Struc
ture of Peace, A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon,
President of the United States, February 9, 1972 (Washington,
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 53.
^Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development,
Economic
OECD Economic Surveys Japan (Paris: Organization for
80.
Co-operation and Development, 1974), p.

3 U.S.

:

.
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campaign promise of protection for the industry
in exchange
for political support

-

a key element of the Southern Strategy

of Nixon's 1968 presidential campaign. 5 7
Japanese textiles

represented only 1.3% of the total U.S. domestic
textile
sales. 6

The textile case reveals an interesting meshing
of

foreign and domestic policies, but the point here is
that, as
one observer noted, "it was the first time Japan had deci-

sively said "NO" to the United States."
Eventually, pressure was applied to Japan which it could

not withstand.

A special ambassador, David Kennedy, was sent

by the United States to conclude textile agreements with the
textile nations of Asia.

A further weapon was the threat to

block ratification of the Okinawa reversion treaty.

Finally,

an agreement was initialed on October 15, 1971, which included

most of the American demands for mandatory export controls.®
During the final round of textile negotiations. President

Nixon discussed the American position regarding its traditional
allies

^John K. Emmerson Arms, Yen & Power, The Japanese Dilem ma (New York: Dune lien Publishing Company, 1971), p. 375.
6 Robert Scalapino, American- Japanese Relations In a
Changing Era The Washington Papers: 2 (New York: The Library
Press, 1972), p. 28.
'Emmerson, Arms, Yen & Power p. 374.
8 Lee W. Farnsworth, "Japan: The Year of the Shock", Asian
Survey XII, No. 1 (1972), 50-51.
,

,

,

,

9
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Both Western Europe and Japan are very potent
competitors of the U.S.; friends, yes; allies,
yes; but competing and competing very hard
with us throughout the world for economic
leadership
.

This was a clear signal to Japan that the old relationship of

favored client was over.

Japan was forced to begin considering

ways to muster enough political strength and diplomatic support
to protect economic interests, once insured by the very separa-

tion of such considerations from economic negotiations.

Another example, the 'dollar shock' of August 1971, was
a manifestation of the growth of independent sources of eco-

nomic power in the world.

The United States felt it had to

take unilateral action to protect its predominant position in
the world economy and to cure an adverse balance of payments

and rising inflation.

The 10% surcharge placed on all imports

was a serious blow to Canada and Europe, but was aimed pri-

marily at the $4.1 billion trade deficit with Japan.

Although

the General Agreement on Trade and Tariff (GATT) members

promptly declared the surcharge illegal,

the United States

-*-9

was still able to use its economic policy as a political tool.
The policy was also designed to force the revaluation of the

9u

.

S

.

Department of State, Bulletin

LXV

,

,

No.

1674

(July 26, 1971), 94.
lORoji Taira, "Power and Trade in U S -Japanese Relations," Asian Survey XII, No. 10 (1972), 982.
.

.

,
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Japanese yen, an action resisted by Japan.

By December 1971,

the Smithsonian Agreement was signed by nine
nations, revalu-

ating the yen upward 16 88%
.

-*-*.

The first of the Nixon shocks was the most
psychologically

distressing to the Japanese, for it undermined the
credibility
of the U.S

.

alliance.

The announcement in July 1971 of the

Nixon trip to Peking, made without prior consultation with
Japanese officials, was a serious blow to Japan's foreign
policy.

Japan had hoped to play a role as mediator, by easing

tensions in Indochina through proposals for regional economic

aid and thereby contributing to improved Sino-American relations.

It was

not the American rapprochement with China but

the failure of the U.S.

to consider Japan in its plans, which

was the reason for the 'shock' effect of the Nixon announcement.

Although Japan had cultivated economic relations with

China over the years, the Nixon shock immediately isolated

Japan from her most important Asian neighbor.
The short-term impact of the U.S. China policy was bene-

Excessive dependence on the United States

ficial to Japan.

was brought to an end.

The imbalance in the relationship was

checked, although not eradicated.

Japan was forced to assume

more independent control of her diplomatic activity.
^-J-Scalapino

,

American- Japanese Relations

,

p.

34.

The
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Sino- Japanese normalization of relations was
accomplished only

six months after the Nixon trip by a new Prime
Minister who

pledged a more positivist foreign policy.

From this perspec-

tive, a new flexibility in Japanese foreign policy
options

was the immediate outcome of the U.S. policy toward China.
run, however, the U.S. attempts to nurture a

balance of power at the expense of traditional allies was not
easy for the Japanese to understand.

The American preoccupa-

tion with the U.S.S.R. and P.R.C., intending to bring about a

period of flexible negotiation, confirmed for Japan that the
special relationship with the United States was ended.

Indi-

cations are that the Nixon shock was at least partially de-

signed to push Japan out of the American nest.
The White House apparently believed that Japan’s psycho-

logical dependence on the U.S. was not consistent with broader
U.S. foreign policy goals and that policies calculated to

force Japan to a more independent foreign policy would, in the

long run, add to the stability of Japanese-American relations.
This view is supported by the February 1972 Nixon foreign

policy report to Congress.
The shocks of 1971, therefore, only accelerated an evolution in U S -Japanese relations that
was in any event, overdue, unavoidable, and in
.

.
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the long run, desirable. 12
We recognize that some of our actions during
the past year placed the Japanese Government
in a difficult position.
We recognize that
our actions have accelerated the Japanese
trend toward more autonomous policies. We
regret the former, but could not do otherwise.
We welcome the latter as both inevitable and
desirable - inevitable because it reflects the
reality of Japanese strength in the 1970's desirable because it is a necessary step in
the transformation of our relationship to the
more mature and reciprocal partnership required in the 1970's. 12

The likelihood of,

in Nixon's words,

"the divergence of some

of our interests" 1 ^ forced Japan to expand the intensity and

diversity of its diplomatic activity.
of the U.S

The change in the nature

alliance enhanced the Japanese reliance on inter-

.

national cooperation and globalism.

The Japan-U.S. partnership in a global context

.

Japanese-

American relations during the last three decades can be di-

vided into three periods:
port in all areas

-

classical cold war,
the middle 1960
(3)

's

(1)

Japanese dependence on U.S. sup-

economic, political, military
(2)

-

during the

emerging economic rivalry, beginning in

and continuing through the early 1970's, and

the present period of adjustment in relations to reflect re-

cent political and economic changes in the international system.
l^ U.S.

Foreign Policy for the 1970'
ture of Peace p. 52.
,

3-3

Ibid

.

,

p.

58.

s.

The Emerging Struc -

32

The upheavals of the middle period
compelled Japan to

consider the relationship with the United
States as only one
part of a complex pattern of external relations.

Japanese

foreign policy shifted from a concentration on
the United
States to an increased awareness of the total pattern.
As early as 1970, the United States began to speak
in
terms of a 'partnership' 15 with Japan, which implied
new

responsibilities for Japan in Asia.

This notion of partner-

ship parallels the reduced U.S. presence in the world and the

essence of the Nixon Doctrine, which is a 'devolution of

American power." 16

The limitations of American power led

former Prime Minister Tanaka to state bluntly that "the United
States is not the almighty answer to all problems." 1 ^

Japan recognizes that it must consider the U.S. relationship in a broader context, one more consistent with the trend

toward multilateral solutions to international problems.

The

Washington Summit Conference of August 1973 solidified the new
15 U.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for
Peace A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President
of the United States, February 18, 1970 (Washington, D.C.:
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1970), p. 58.
16 Robert E. Osgood, The Weary and the Wary: U.S. and
Japanese Security Policies in Transition Studies in International Affairs Number 16 (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1972), pp. 83-90.
Washington Post August 1, 1973.
,

^

,
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di^-^ctiion in the U.S.- Japan alliance,

as revealed in the Nixon-

Tanaka joint communique.
They noted especially that the relationship
between their two countries has an increasingly important global aspect and makes a significant contribution to the movement toward peaceful relations throughout the world. 18
The new relationship does not mean that the United States

has stopped offering support to Japan on selected issues.

On

the contrary, President Nixon gave explicit backing to one of

Japan's most desired foreign policy goals, a permanent seat in
the U N Security Council.

The President expressed the belief that for the
Security Council to fulfill its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international
peace and security under the United Nations
Charter, a way should be found to assure permanent representation in that council for Japan,
whose resources and influence are of major importance in world affairs. 19

Japan will continue to seek diplomatic support from the United
States, although it will not be forthcoming on many issues,

such as the global energy crisis, where interests do not coincide

.

The altered American role in the multipolar era has

directly affected the range of Japanese foreign policy options.
Goals which were once politically impossible such as diplomatic
lb japan Report

16,

1973, p. 2.
19 Ibid.

,

"Text of Tanaka- Nixon Communique," August
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relations with China became relatively easy to
achieve.

It

would have been unthinkable twenty years ago for
a top-level
U.S. foreign policy report to contain the following
statement.

Japan has interests of her own of which she
herself will be the untimate judge. Our
foreign policies will not be identical or
invariably in step. 20
This assertion was part of the new relationship in
1973, a

relationship which suited the Japanese itch to gain a measure
of international independence and prestige.

On the other

hand, Japan can take little comfort from the knowledge that
U.S. policy toward Japan is largely dictated by the dynamics

of the U

.

S

.

-U

.

S

.

S

.

R

.

-

P R C
.

.

.

triangle.

Also, the benefits of

greater independence can only be of practical value if Japan
overcomes the political isolation resulting from more flexible
relations with the United States.

Trilateralism
The fact that Japan's political and economic systems

largely follow Western patterns indicates a special relationship which exists between Japan and the Western, industrialized

nations of North America and Western Europe.

In November 1973

the Trilateral Commission met in New York City for the first
2^ U.S. Foreign "Policy for the 1970's, Shaping a Durable
Peace A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of
the United States, May 3, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 102.
,
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time, with Prime Minister Tanaka as the keynote speaker.

Al-

though this commission is a non-governmental organization, its

existence is symbolic of efforts to define the political relationship among the three centers of 'free-world' economic
power.

The Commission assumes that it is in the interest of

the three

comers of the triangle

to develop closer ties and

more coordinated policies, since their generally similar systems should lead to a coincidence of foreign policy goals.

further rationale for trilateralism

is

A

that Japan's importance

to the world can best be understood and channeled in a joint,

cooperative affiliation.

Trilateralism is relevant to Japan

because a broader Western alliance could fulfill the NixonTanaka goal of a U.S.- Japan relationship in a global context.
The idea of bringing Japan into a formal partnership with
the West was broached by Henry Kissinger during a speech in

April concerning revision of the Atlantic Charter.

Although

this speech was reported to have included Japan in the plans

for a new Western alliance, in fact Japan was mentioned only

briefly.

"Japan has emerged as a major power center.

In many

2i
fields Atlantic solutions, to be viable, must include Japan."

Nonetheless, the Kissinger speech made it very clear that the
a
U.s. -Western European alliance would continue to exist on

Zi The New York Times, April 24,

1973.
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much higher plane than any broadened relationship with
Japan.
Prime Minister Tanaka expressed interest in a formal

Japanese link with the West, and in July 1973, Tanaka stated
that one of the goals of his forthcoming trip to Washington

and Western Europe was to advance a "triangular relationship 22 between Japan, the United States and Western Europe.

Tanaka also promised that Japan was ready "to contribute the
full measure of its capacity to this common cause. "22 although

external factors were to thwart Japan's efforts to consolidate
relations with the Western powers.
The summit conference in Washington did not advance the

cause of trilateralism as Tanaka had hoped.

The communique

resulting from the talks with President Nixon mentioned only
"the desirability of a declaration of principles to guide

future cooperation among the industrialized democracies "24
.

This vague reference to a larger Japanese role with the West

indicated a change in U.S. policy reflecting the difficulties
of creating such an alliance in times of economic competitive-

ness and heightened nationalism.

Many of these difficulties involve Europe.

To begin with,

European-American relations were undergoing strains, ironically
2^ xhe New York~~Times , July 24, 1973.
22 fhe New York Times
August 2, 1973.
24 japan Report "Text of Tanaka-Nixon Communique," p. 2.
,

,

.
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during the period designated by President Nixon as the 'Year
of Europe'.

The oil crisis in the fall of 1973 pointed to

conflicting national interests.

The United States, less

affected by new OPEC policy, could afford to meet the crisis
from strength, hoping to force the oil producing nations to

moderate their demands.

Western Europe, and of course Japan,

was vulnerable, and therefore cautious of the U.S. approach
which, it considered provocative.

The different approaches to

handling the oil crisis and the differing reactions to Arab
demands brought about a cooling in relations between the U.S.

and Europe.

Japan did not want to become involved in the

bickering

Western European relations with Japan also showed signs
of weakening.

Japan had never been close to Europe.

Geo-

graphical, cultural, and historical differences have kept Japan
and Europe apart.

Japan's growing economic impact served to

make Europe wary of any close relationship with Japan.

Efforts

to strengthen the Common Market preoccupy Western Europe.

This, Prime Minister Tanaka found out during his visit to

France, Britain, and West Germany in October 1973.

Although

received as an important foreign dignitary, Tanaka was unable
to extract from the Europeans any substantive commitments.

Japan's newfound importance to the world outdistanced Japan

s
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ability to use it for diplomatic success.

Not only was Europe

skeptical of Tanaka's motive in desiring an expanded Atlantic
Charter, some Europeans also viewed Japan as an advocate of

American interests. 26
In April 1974, a full year after Kissinger's first speech

on the subject, plans for closer ties to Europe were shelved

indefinitely by the Japanese. 26

Japan itself had had no suc-

cess in developing closer relations with the West.

Once

signals were sent to Japan that U.S. support for the trilateral idea was withdrawn, Japan could do nothing but give
up the idea as well. 22

Not only do external factors determine the feasibility
of a Japanese role with the West.

The requirements of Japanese

diplomacy also place constraints on the development of triSince the U.S. and Europe represent nearly 40%

lateralism.

of Japan's export markets, 26 Japan is understandably concerned
about becoming involved in disputes which might arise within
the Atlantic alliance.

Furthermore, a trilateral alliance of

democratic, industrialized, Western nations would run the risk
25koj i Nakamura, "Red-Carpet Rebuff," Far Eastern Eco nomic Review LXXXII, No. 41 (1973), p. 13.
26 New~York Times , April 21, 1974.
27 Ibid
28 japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on
International Trade, Japan 1974 (n.p. Japan External Trade
Organization, 1974), p. 9.
,

.
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of antagonizing the communist nations.

Japan would not be

interested in tightening political and economic ties with the

West if ideological implications were attached.

A strong Western partnership would be counterproductive
to Japan if it were in any way exclusive, or used as leverage

against the developing nations.

Statements on trilateralism

indicate that Japan hopes to develop economic relations with
Europe, prevent economic protectionism, and create more effective channels for prior consultation on major policy changes

among the industrialized nations of the West.

However,

Japan's diplomatic requirements are too complex to be tied
solely to the West.

loosely defined.

For trilateralism to work it must be
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CHAPTER
JAPAN AND EAST ASIA:

III

THE MAJOR POWERS

Regionalism

The concept of the regional subsystem is consistent with

middle-range systems theory adopted in this paper.

The ratio-

nale for its use follows from characteristics of the present

international system, namely, multipolarity, the inability of
the devalued bipolar military power to compel compliance around
the world, and the increasingly regional basis of continued

bipolar competition.

During the 1950's one could detect in

East Asia only the conflict between the East (the P.R.C., with

Soviet support) and the West (the United States).

East Asia

itself was enveloped by this confrontation; no indigenous support for a purely regional focus survived in the context of
the bipolar international system.

Regional goals were sub-

ordinated to the global struggle between the superpowers.

With the gradual disintegration of the cold war inter-

national system, however, alternatives to alliances with a
superpower became not only feasible, but necessary.

As inter

action with major powers decreases, interaction with regional

neighbors increases.

Both heightened rivalries as well as

is that
local friendships have emerged, but the point here
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local issues take on added significance.
to

Regionalism refers

organizational efforts to improve security, strengthen

economic development, and establish diplomatic support, as

well as less formal interaction, as long as it is expressed

within a recognizable unit of the global international system.
For our purposes regionalism is defined as a group of nations,

within the same general geographical area, interacting on a
combination of economic, political, military, and cultural
planes, the impact of which is limited mainly to the region
in question.

This does not preclude nations in a region

having important extra-regional relations

-

the definition

only stresses the existence of strictly regional concerns which
can be dealt with by regionally defined methods.

Decentralization of the international system is now an
important element of world politics, whether expressed through
the as yet limited success of regional organization, or by the

increased incidence of regional conflicts.

The regional set-

ting, then, is an important aspect of the context of Japanese

foreign policy, since Japan interacts with other East Asian

nations and must react to area developments.

There is now a

regional pattern of interaction in East Asia which supplements
the continuing military bipolarity.

For Japan, not only are

there global constraints on foreign policy but regional ones
as well.

.
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The task of determining the members of an East
Asian sys-

tem is arbitrary because different lists could be made
according
to different criteria of selection.

We begin with Japan's two

major communist neighbors, the People's Republic of China and
the Soviet Union, and the two Koreas in between.

The Soviet

Union is historically a European power, but the implications
of Siberian development, the large Pacific naval force, and the

Soviet interests in East Asian collective security warrant the

inclusion of the Soviet Union.

In South East Asia the five

member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations
(ASEAN)

1

and Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos, and Burma are included.

Australia and New Zealand have reoriented their foreign policy
toward East Asia in recent years, mostly because of the British

decisions to join the Common Market and phase out military

commitments in the South East Asian area.

Finally, the United

States is included, as a Pacific basin state with permanent
o

influence and interests in the area.

^Indonesia the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, and
Singapore
^The purpose here is to offer a general framework, as a
basis for discussing the regional context of Japan's foreign
The concept of 'region', therefore, is loosely defined.
policy.
A more systematic approach is advanced by Louis J. Can tori and
Steven L. Spiegel, "The International Relations of Regions," in
Regional Politics and World Order ed. by Richard Falk and Saul
Mendlovitz (San Francisco: W.H. Freeman Company, 1973), pp.
In each region, the authors identify a cote sector,
335-353.
a peripheral sector, and an intrusive system.
,

,
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As the will to use nuclear weapons waned, a nation’s geo-

graphical position

took,

on added significance.

Xn fact,

the

growth of regionalism alone is an indication that geopolitics

may be of renewed importance to foreign policy options.

Japan

is located at the point where the world's three most powerful

nations meet.

This cannot but continue to affect Japan's

foreign policy considerations.

Furthermore, Japan is uniquely

insular, though situated in the midst of powerful nations.

The lack of land borders leaves open a certain degree of

flexibility, although Japan will always represent a crucial

strategic interest to China, the Soviet Union, Korea and the

United States.

Japan is a unique link between East and West

in North East Asia.

Culturally and historically Asian, but

industrially Western, Japan has also had to tread carefully in
South East Asia.

Japan represents a unique hybrid of cultures,

ideologies, and development patterns which are best seen through
Japan's East Asian setting.

A country's relationship to a region is determined initially by geography, but also by trade relations, strategic
factors, and political decisions as to how closely a nation

chooses to integrate policy with the region.

Is Japan limited

to a regional role in international affairs, or are there

actually constraints upon Japan's integration with East Asia?
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How will the position in East Asia affect Japan's
options in
selecting a broader international role?

These questions sug-

gest a further question often posed in the form of an
alter-

native between partnership with the West or leadership in East
Asia.

3

It is argued in this paper that serious constraints

block the exclusive pursuit of either alternative.

The United States in Asia
The East Asian component of U.S.- Japan relations effects

Japan's policy toward the regional environment.

The American

presence in, and policy toward, East Asia has undergone drastic
changes in the last five years, which will influence Japanese
policy options in the years ahead.
The Nixon Doctrine was an indication that the United States

planned a reduced presence in East Asia.

As a loosely defined

set of principles and proposals, the Doctrine did more to re-

flect the events of the immediate past than to shape the events
of the immediate future.

Domestic problems combined with a

disaster in Indochina to necessitate a rethinking of American
3japanese partnership with the West is the thesis of
Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Fragile Blossom, Crisis and Change in
Japan (New York: Harper & Row, 1972). An alternative approach
is taken by Donald Hellmann who argues that Japan's position
See his Japan
in international affairs is linked to East Asia.
and East Asia.
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foreign policy.

President Nixon perceived that the Doctrine

"is given full meaning through a process that involves other

countries.

indicating that American power was no longer able

to achieve its goals unaided.

By implication, the Nixon Doc-

trine did not elaborate new patterns of international inter-

action; rather it refused to accept responsibility alone for
the patterns which would develop.

The Nixon Doctrine is more relevant to Japan than to any

other nation in East Asia, because it places new responsibilities on American allies.

Our Asian friends, especially Japan, are in a
position to shoulder larger responsibilities
for the peaceful progress of the area.

Japan's partnership with us will be a key to
the success of the Nixon Doctrine in Asia.-*
The premise of the new American Asian policy is that a lower

level of activity, focused on more limited but essential

interests, will be a more constructive approach to accomplishing foreign policy goals.

This policy offers Japan more flex-

ibility in managing its regional affairs.
4u s. Foreign Policy for the 1970' s. Building for Peace
A Report to the Congress by Richard Nixon, President of the
United States, February 25, 1971 (Washington, D.C.: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 20.
5 u.S. Foreign Policy for the 1970's, A New Strategy for
Peace p. 54 and 58.
t

,

,
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Xn order to capitalize on this flexibility,

Japan will

still have to pay close attention to America's changing position in East Asia.

There are clues to what this position will

be in the aftermath of the conflict in Indochina.

The devas-

tating failure of United States policy in Vietnam and Cambodia
and the decision to withdraw all military forces indicate
that the U.S. can no longer play the role of an 'Asian Power.'

Thailand, once a militant American ally during the height of
the Vietnam war, has requested the withdrawal of all 25,000

United States troops by April, 1976. 6

Similarly, the Philip-

pines has asked to renegotiate a 1947 agreement establishing

American rights to the use of air and naval bases on Philippine
soil.

^

Both the Philippines and Thailand know that the United

States no longer has the will or the power to play an effective role on the Asian mainland, and have sought to redirect

their international relations away from the U.S., toward a

more solidified Asia.

President Marcos is convinced that the

only purpose of the United States in East Asia is "to maintain
an effective presence over the air and sea lanes of the western

Pacific.

Implied is the opinion that otherwise, the U.S.

would continue to play a disruptive role.
bThe New York~Times April 10, 1975.
7 The New York Times
July 12, 1975.
8 The New York Times, July 8, 1975.
,

,

.
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There is every indication, however, that the U.S. intends
to maintain a strong posture in the Pacific, and that it is as

a

'Pacific Power' that the United States can most effectively

guard its most basic interests.

According to the 1970 Presi-

dential foreign policy report:
First, we remain involved in Asia.
We are
a Pacific power.
We have learned that peace
for us is much less likely if there is no
peace
Asia.^

m

This report also noted a "growing sense of Asian identity," and
the development of "a new and healthy pattern of international

relationships in the region. "10
be a less dominant element of the

Since the United States will
'new pattern', other forces

will have a more direct effect upon the character of a post-

Vietnam Asia.

The Soviet Union

Japanese-Soviet relations involve the following issues:
(1)

the Northern Territories dispute,

tion in Siberian development,

(3)

(2)

Japanese participa-

peace treaty negotiations,

and (4) Soviet proposals for an East Asian system of collective
security
9 U<S

.

Foreign Policy for the 1970

Peace, p. 54.
10 ibid.

's,

A New Strategy for

.
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The Northern Territories dispute can
be traced back to
the closing days of World War II when the
Soviet Union entered
the Pacific war breaking the Soviet- Japanese
Neutrality

Pact.^

A secret agreement was concluded at the Yalta conference
of
February, 1945, that in return for Soviet entry
into the war,
the Kurile Islands shall be handed over to the
Soviet Union.

After occupation of the islands, the Soviet Union began to
claim them as permanent national territory.

The present con-

troversy, however, concerns only the southernmost of the

Kurile Islands, closest to Japan's northern island of Hokkaido.

13

Because of the Japanese feelings of betrayal, and

other cultural and ideological differences, the Soviet Union
is one of the nations least trusted by the Japanese. 1 ^

Such

feelings have had a negative effect upon diplomatic relations
and have undoubtedly heightened the intensity of Japanese

opinion regarding the Northern Territories.
*

-

-

—

-

1L Shigeo Sugiyama,

"Diplomatic Relations between Japan
and the Soviet Union with Particular Emphasis on Territorial
Questions," in Japan in World Politics ed. by Young C. Kim
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), p. 24.
According to the Pact, the Soviet Union was bound not to go
to war against Japan until at least April 24, 1946.
12 ibid
l^Kunashiri Island, Etorofu Island, Shikotan Island, and
the Habomai Islands.
14-According to a public opinion poll conducted in January,
1975, by Ross Snyder & Son, Inc. (Delray Beach, Florida), The
Soviet Union was chosen as a least liked nation more often than
any other except South Korea.
,

,

.
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Two other wartime Allied conferences provide somewhat

contradictory documentation concerning ownership of the islands.

The record becomes even more confusing if century-

-*-5

old treaties are considered part of the evidence.

At the 1951

San Francisco Peace Treaty conference, Prime Minister Yoshida

noted a claim only of Shikotan Island and the Habomai group.

^

Likewise, Article 9A of the 1956 Japan- Soviet Declaration

ending the state of war stated in part:
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
desiring to meet the wishes of Japan and
taking into consideration the interests of
the Japanese State, agrees to transfer to Japan
the Habomai Islands and the island of Shikotan,
the actual transfer to these islands to Japan
to take place after the conclusion of a Peace
17
Treaty.
.

.

.

.

.

Thus both sides agreed publicly during the 1950's that the

Shikotan and Habomai islands would eventually be transferred
to Japan.

Premier Khruschev notified Tokyo in 1960 that return

of these same islands was contingent upon the withdrawal of

Since that time, Japanese and

American troops from Japan.

Soviet positions have diverged even more.
Cairo Declaration of November 27, 1943 followed by
as
the Potsdam Proclamation of July 26, 1945 were ambiguous
See Shigeo Sugiyama
to the status of the islands in question.
"Diplomatic Relations between Japan and the Soviet Union,"
pp. 22-23.
26
16 ibid
p
17 ibid
30.
p
Tokyo,"
l^Elizabeth Pond, "Japan and Russia: The View from
l-^The

.

,

.

,

.

.
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The Northern Territories problem has been overtaken by
time and events; its solution has been frustrated by being

linked with other, seemingly unrelated issues.

Until 1972 the

Soviet Union used the continued United States control of

Okinawa as leverage in the dispute.

More recently, return of

the Northern Territories has been used as the carrot to entice

Japan to invest heavily, and on easy terms, in Siberia.

The

U.S.S.R. can no longer separate the disagreement with Japan

from other territorial disputes, notably with the P.R.C., but
also involving Eastern Europe.

If the Soviet Union acceded

to Japanese demands to alter the territorial status quo, other

claims against the Soviet Union would be strengthened.

There-

fore, the position has been hardened, and officials in Moscow

are now unwilling to publicly discuss the issue, which Pravda

described as the "non-existent 'northern territories problem'".
The emotional nature of the Northern Territories issue is

intensified by Soviet harassment of Japanese fisherman in the
traditional fishing grounds surrounding the contested islands.
The Soviet navy has patrolled the area and from 1946-1970 the

Hitchcock, Jr., "Joint Development of Siberia:
Decision-Making in Japanese-Soviet Relations," Asian Survey
I y David

I.

,

XI, No. 3

(1971),

291.

19
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Japan Maritime Safety Agency reports 1336 vessels captured and
11,316 persons arrested.

2(1

The dispute involving the northern islands is the key

obstacle to better Soviet- Japanese relations.
there appears to be no obvious solution.

Furthermore

Since 1967, the

Japanese have had ad hoc committees in both Houses of the
Diet dealing with the Northern Territories. 21

All political

parties agree at least that the two southern islands should
be returned.

The public statements of Prime Minister Miki

and Foreign Minister Miyazawa have been unequivocal in in-

sisting that the future of Soviet- Japanese relations rests on
the reversion of the northern islands.

Since 1969 it has

been the policy of the Japanese government to designate
Shikotan, Etorofu, Kunashiri, and the Habomai Islands as
23
Japanese territory on all maps.

It is possible that the

solution to this problem lies in the broader context of Asian

^Shigeo Sugiyama, "Diplomatic Relations between Japan
Elizabeth Pond reports that in
and the Soviet Union," p. 33.
1973 500 vessels and 70 persons were still held by the Soviet
"Japan and Russia," pp. 150-151.
Union.
21 Japan Institute of International Affairs, White Papers
of Japan 1971-1972 pp. 399-405.
^For example, Japan Report "Policy Speech by Prime
Minister Takeo Miki," March 1, 1975 (special supplement), p.
3., and Ibid., "Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Kiichi
,

,

Miyazawa," p. 6.
23nitchcock, "Joint Development of Siberia,"

p.

288.
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security and gradually developing economic relationships, but
for the time being the Northern Territories disagreement will

forestall close Soviet- Japanese diplomatic relations.
Since 1955, when negotiations resumed diplomatic relations but failed to conclude a peace treaty, the Northern

Territories question has frustrated attempts by the Soviet
Union and Japan to settle permanently the Second World War,
which, officially at least, remains unresolved.

Since the

Japanese are concerned about national security, they wish to
solidify the relationship with the Soviet Union, the major

potential military threat to Japan.

Japan is also interested

in balancing the successes in Sino- Japanese relations by making

progress toward closer relations with the Soviet Union.
One of Prime Minister Miki's first major diplomatic

decisions was to send Foreign Minister Miyazawa to Moscow to
discuss the state of negotiations toward a peace treaty.

The

joint announcement contained only vague references to an "exchange of views both on questions of Soviet- Japanese relations

and on some international problems of mutual interest."

2 A-

The

Japanese desire to include specific references to the territorial problem in the Japan- Soviet Announcement met with strong

^ Japan
1975.

Times Weekly (International Edition), January 25,

.
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resistance, and such references were left out. 26
The Soviet Union next proposed that a treaty of good neigh-

borliness and cooperation be concluded immediately, in spite of
the deadlock over the peace treaty. 26

This would bypass the

necessity of solving the territorial problem, by continuing to
shelve it until conclusion of a formal peace treaty.

Further-

more, a friendship treaty would strengthen the Soviet position
in East Asia and, most importantly, would provide leverage

against the People's Republic of China.

Japan immediately re-

jected the proposal, leaving negotiations at a stalemate.
Plans for Japanese economic cooperation in the develop-

ment of the vast eastern region of the Soviet Union have been
actively considered since the first meeting, in 1966, of the
27
Japanese-Soviet Joint Economic Cooperation Committee.

The

first substantive results of the Committee's work were the
1968 Amur River timber agreement and the 1970 Vrangel Port

facilities development agreement.
In the spring of 1974 a package deal was initiated in-

volving Japanese capital loans of approximately

1

billion

Prime Minister met with similar resistance during
See The New York
his summit meeting with the Soviets in 1973.
Times October 10, 1973.
26 Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), February 22,
^5 ibid

.

,

1.975

^Hitchcock, "Joint Development of Siberia,"

p.

283.
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dollars for coal, gas, and timber projects. 28

Specific memo-

randa involving coal and forestry resources were signed in May
and July respectively.

There still remain serious constraints

on the final terms of major oil and gas projects, since they

require a heavy commitment of Japanese funds.

Japan is wary

of the concessionary loan terms asked by the Soviet Union.

There have also been disagreements over prices of Siberian

resources.

Japan has complained that the Russians want inter-

est rates as low as those given to developing nations, while

demanding prices higher than Japan pays for Australian coal or

Middle East oil. 29

Japan is also suspicious of the accuracy

of Soviet technical estimates.

Japanese surveying teams are

not allowed to do their own studies at the oil, gas, and coal
sites to determine the investment risk.

The Soviet Union

prefers to manage the projects without direct Japanese partici_
30
pation.
.

At a Joint Economic Cooperation Committee meeting in the
fall of 1974, the Japanese delegation voiced these reservations
to participation in Siberian development by announcing that

involvement in the largest single resource project
z ^ The

New York~Times

,

-

the Tyumen

April 23, 1974.

29 ibid.

30 Kiishi Saeki, "Toward Japanese Cooperation ip Siberian
Development," Problems of Communism , XXI (May-June 1972), p.
11

.
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oil field

-

would be "difficult ." 31

The underlying political

implications of Siberian development weighed more heavily in
the decision to proceed cautiously than economic uncertainty.

For example, the new railroad line to the Pacific will cross
territory claimed by China.

The railroad will add to the

infrastructure and thereby facilitate development in that disputed region, as well as contribute to the Soviet strategic

position as a Pacific power.

Japan is worried that taking

part in these projects will be detrimental to her relations

with China, and will compromise her policy of non- involvement
in Sino-Soviet rivalry.

A further concern is that the Soviet

Union is interested in obtaining long-term commitments in order
to lock Japan into a dependency upon Siberian resources, which

in turn could be used for political purposes in isolating Japan

from China and advancing Soviet policies in East Asia.
The three issues of Soviet- Japanese relations discussed
so far

-

the Northern Territories problem, conclusion of a

peace treaty, and Siberian development, in fact Soviet policy

toward Japan in general

-

are better explained in terms of

Soviet goals in East Asia.

Now that the European Security Conference has ratified
the status quo in Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union is freer to

Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), November
9

,

1974

.
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concentrate on problems at and around her Asian borders. 32
Soviet interests in East Asia are inextricably tied to China
and the hostilities which surfaced in the early 1960's.

The

foremost Asian goal, then, is to protect Soviet territory east
of the Urals, but especially the areas along the Chinese border.

The massive military deployment by both sides attests

to the seriousness attached to the border issue.

Other Soviet

interests in East Asia stem from the primary need

(1)

guarantee national security in that part of the world,

to
(2)

to

dissuade nations, especially in Southeast Asia, from aligning

with China,

(3)

to prevent a Sino- Japanese alliance, and (4)

to prevent Chinese predominance on Russia's eastern flank, by

establishing a strong Soviet presence in the Pacific through
expanded diplomatic efforts and naval power.
Soviet efforts to devise a new Asian policy were initi-

ated by General Secretary Brezhnev in June 1969 at the Inter-

national Communist Conference held in Moscow.
For us, the burning problems of the present
international situation do not push into the
background more long-range tasks, especially
the creation of a system of collective
security in those parts of the world where
the threat of the unleashing of a new world
JZ The New York Times, August 28,

1975.
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war and the unleashing of armed conflicts is
centered. ... We think that the course of
events also places on the agenda the task of
creating a system of collective security in
Asia. 33

It is clear from the preceeding quote that, as first proposed

by Brezhnev, the collective security idea lacked substance.

Since then the proposal has not been embellished or developed

by its authors, although it has become one of the most fre-

quently included components of Asian policy statements.
Like the Nixon Doctrine which was introduced a month
later, the Soviet proposal represented an attempt to deal

with changes in international relations in Asia.

For the

United States, and Britain as well, the reappraisal of Asian
policy signalled a decreasing willingness to continue direct

involvement in East Asia.

For the Soviet Union, new Asian

policy meant just the opposite

-

an interest in actively

taking advantage of the newly flexible Asian setting.

Col-

lective security provided a vehicle for the Soviet Union to

project its influence into East Asia.

It was proposed as an

alternative to American policy, embodied in the Nixon Doctrine, and as a means of profiting from a combination of the

American failure in Indochina and detente.

The objective of

dd Qurrent Digest of the Soviet Press
(1969), p. 16.

[CDSP], XXI, No. 23
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the collective security proposal was not to eclipse U.S. in-

flu^nce in the region as much as to check the development of
Chinese power.
The proposal has had little success.

Only Iran, Afghan-

istan, and the Mongolian People's Republic have formally

approved of the idea, ^ and no nations located on the strategically important East Asian rim have endorsed the plan.

Although the Soviet Union has enhanced its influence in
Southern Asia, even India has refused to join the Soviet plan.
As long as Chinese hostility to the plan continues

-

a fore-

gone conclusion since Peking considers the plan to be directed

against China

-

it will not succeed.

The unwillingness of

Asian nations to antagonize China by supporting a collective
security agreement with the Soviet Union will preclude any
substantive results.
The effect of the proposal is to notify the nations of

East Asia of fundamental Soviet interests in the region and
the intention of the Soviet Union to play a more positive role

there.

The observation that this general purpose underlies

the specific collective security proposal is supported by the

following excerpt from Pray da

.

-^Alexander 0. Ghebhardt, "The Soviet System of Collective Security in Asia," Asian Survey XIII, No. 12 (1973),
,

p.

1082.
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Such a security system can probably be created
step by step through both collective and bilateral efforts by states. There is a broad
field of activity for the realization of the
very humane tasks set by the Soviet proposal
on the creation of a collective security system in Asia. 35
The Soviet Union is intent upon building a network of support
in East Asia, by whatever means, and probably never expected
to create a system of collective security.

The fact that Soviet policy is newly directed toward East

Asia is in itself a constraint on Japanese foreign policy.
Japan will be important to the Soviet Union only in terms of

relations with China, as long as Japan has no nuclear weapons.
But as a means of establishing a credible diplomatic record
in East Asia, Japan offers attractive possibilities to the

Soviet Union.

Although Moscow publicly maintains its oppo-

sition to the Japanese military relationship with the United
States 36 Tokyo has been notified that the Treaty of Mutual
,

Security no longer stands in the way of Japanese participation
37
in a Sovie t- sponsored collective security system.

Thus the Soviet Union is attempting to draw Japan into a

relationship which will serve more fundamental Soviet goals in
-^CDSP, XXVI, No. 50 (1975), 10-11.
July 15, 1974.
36 phe New York Times
37par Eastern Economic Review, LXXXII (October 22, 1973),
,

19.
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East Asia.

A March, 1974 article in Izvestia even suggested

that support for Soviet initiatives concerning the region:

would help Japan to establish equal contacts
with the countries in the rest of Asia and
to come to a genuine understanding of the new
Asia; without a correct attitude toward these
countries, Japan will be unable to exist as a
state with a firm and definite position in the
world. °
It is precisely to establish the goals mentioned by Izvestia

that Japan continues to resist Soviet proposals and to treat

with utmost care her diplomatic relations with the Soviet
Union.

The People's Republic of China

The solution to Japan's pre-1972 China problem was found
in the external setting, namely the Sino- American rapproche-

ment which freed Japan to normalize relations with Peking.
Geographical proximity, military power, and territorial and

manpower resources dictate that China will play an increasingly important part in Japanese foreign policy in a post-Vietnam

Asia.

Relations with China will also continue to be dominated

by external factors, although the Soviet Union has replaced
the United States as the primary consideration.

U.S.-U.S.S.R.

military bipolarity remains, as does the importance of the
3»CDSP, XXVI, No.

6

(1974), 10-11.
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United States in the Pacific.

However, the detente between

the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., and the United States and China, as

well as the ongoing Sino-Soviet split, have turned Japan's
relations with China into a more regionally defined issue.
Chinese analysis of East Asian international relations is

now based on a perceived threat from the Soviet Union.

The

Chinese delegate to the last session of the Economic and Social

Commission for Asia and the Pacific in March, 1975 gave the
following account of the Soviet danger in Asia.
The superpower that claims to be 'socialist'
talks about detente, peace, disarmament and
security everywhere, and most vociferously
at that.
But in fact it is this superpower
that is most energetically expanding its
armaments and preparing for war, carrying
out aggression and expansion, threatening
the security of other countries, creating
tensions and contending hard with the other
superpower for hegemony in the Asian-Pacific
region. ^9

The Shanghai Communique of February, 1972, which established
"the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all U.S. forces
40 and the removal of
and military installations from Taiwan."
U.S. troops from Indochina, enabled China to concentrate her

energies on a more immediately threatening local rivalry with
Moscow.
XVIII, No. 13 (1975), 17.
40The New York Times, February 28, 1972.
39 peking Review

,
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Smo-Soviet hostility will determine the extent
Japan

s

relations with China can improve.

to which

An easing of Sino-

Soviet tensions could significantly alter the
scope of foreign

policy options for Japan.
U.S. or U.S.S.R.

-

China would view Japan

-

not the

as the greatest regional threat, based on

ideological differences, the challenge of Japan's economic

power in Southeast Asia, and the technological capability
of

exercising the nuclear option.

There are no indications, how-

ever, that the Sino-Soviet rift will be quickly or easily nar-

rowed.

The vicious ideological recriminations which have shot

back and forth between Moscow and Peking are the most serious
aspect of the problem.

Ideological differences tend to leave

less room for compromise when found between groups claiming
the same source of inspiration.

In Peking's view,

it is much

worse to be a secret capitalist while claiming to be a socialist
(U.S.S.R.), than to be an outright capitalist (U.S.).

Even if ideological arguments were settled, there would

remain a tension

bom

of geography and heightened by Chinese

claims of some Soviet territory in several regions of the long,

mutual border which divides the two nations.

Nationalism would

preclude a reconciliation complete enough to remove the lingering fears of the powerful Soviet military and the increasingly

sophisticated Chinese nuclear weaponry.
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Since Japan occupies a very important strategic position
in East Asia, one of China's goals is to improve relations
with

Tokyo as a counterbalance to the Soviet Union.

The single

sentence dealing with Japan in Chou En-lai's address to the
First Session of the Fourth National People's Congress in

January 1975 expressed the desire to "promote friendly and
good neighborly relations between the two countries.

"4- 1
.

.

.

This is in marked contrast to the former pattern of Chinese

statements about Japanese 'reactionaries' and 'militarists',

especially relating to the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty, which
Peking claimed had become an "alliance spearheaded against the
,.42
Asian Peoples.

Beginning in January 1972, however, the

Chinese press organs and statements of public officials dropped
all mention of the Security Treaty and significantly reduced

concentration on Japanese militarism.

^

1

Although Peking was

certainly reluctant to offend the United States prior to the

historic Nixon visit, the less antagonistic public statements
41 Peking Review XVIII, No. 4 (1975), 24.
People of Asia, Unite and Drive the U.S. Aggressors
(Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1970), p. 14.
out of Asia
"The Nixon Doctrine in Asia," in East
Miyoshi,
43osamu
Asia and the World System, Part I: The Super-Powers and the
Context Adelphi Papers No. 91 (London: IISS, 1972), p. 17.
Miyoshi 's conclusion is confirmed by a context analysis of the
Chinese press done by Shinkichi Eto, from October 1971 to May
"Japan and China-A New Stage?," Problems of Communism
1972.

^

,

!

,

XXI (November-December

,

1972), p. 4.

.
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intended to open up a new era in Sino— Japanese

ire -

lntions
In September 1972 Prime Minister Tanaka visited Peking to

begin the new era.

Virtually nil major, outstanding problems

were resolved in the Joint Statement^* resulting from the
-

tnlks:

(1)

Jnpnn recognized the P.R.C. 3s "sole legal govern-

ment" of Chinn.

(2)

Jnpnn nccepted Peking's clnim thnt Tniwnn

is "nn innliennble pnrt of the territory of the People's

Republic of Chinn." (3) Peking renounced its demnnd for wnr
indemnities.

(4)

The stnte of wnr between the two countries

was terminated, and Japan expressed regret for "causing enor-

mous damages in the past to the Chinese people through war."
(5)

Diplomatic relations between Japan and China were estab-

lished immediately, and the Japan-Taiwan treaty of 1952, as

well as diplomatic relations with that government, was ended.
China has gone further than merely halting the attacks on
the U.S.- Japan alliance, by actually lending support to the
5
continuation of "intimate" relations between the two nations.^

There are several reasons for the Chinese tacit approval of the

U.s.- Japan Security Treaty.

The presence of the United States

statement of the Government of the People's
Republic of China and the Government of Japan," in A New Page
Foreign
in the Annals of Sino- Japanese Relations (Peking:
Language Press, 1972), pp. 15-18.
Japan Times Weekly (International Edition), February
9-4"j 0 i n t

1,

1975.

65

in Japan acts as a deterrent to the spread of Soviet influence
in East Asia.

The continued stationing of U.S. troops in Japan

also precludes the formation of a strong Soviet alliance with
the Japanese which could be turned toward Peking.

Furthermore,

as long as Japan relies on the United States for its basic

security, there will be no need for Japan to 'go nuclear',

something China would consider greatly destabilizing to the
East Asian region and injurious to her interests.

A major focus of Chinese foreign policy in the East Asian
and Pacific region is to "oppose the hegemonism of the super-

powers."^

China has consistently warned against superpower

hegemony, and the fact that the phrase quoted here appears in
the preamble of the new Constitution of the People's Republic

of China indicates the permanence of the issue.
Sino- Japanese relations are governed in part by the Chinese

strategy of befriending Japan in order to drive a wedge between
Japan and the Soviet Union.

The Chinese fear that Japan will

be drawn into a collective security arrangement with the Soviet
Union, even if only indirectly, through a series of economic

agreements or statements of cooperation and friendship.
One of the Soviet aims in coaxing and coercing
Japan is to put it in the orbit of Soviet
"Asian collective security system." Ever since
46 Peking Review , XVIII, No. 4 (1975), 13.

^

.

66

Brezhnev contrived this scheme in 1969, the
Kremlin has cast its eyes on Japan.
China has used similar arguments about Soviet ulterior motives
to warn Japan not to participate in Siberian development pro-

48

„
jects
.

China capitalizes on a more emotional issue by strenuously

supporting Japan's claim to the Northern territories.
To make way for their military presence in
the Pacific through the Sea of Japan and
build up hegemony there, the Kremlin's new
tsars for many years have been trying by
hook or by crook to hold on to Japan's
northern territories which they occupy
.

This support for Japan is consistent with China's own terri-

torial claims against the Soviet Union, but does not represent
any congruence in long term Chinese and Japanese foreign policy
goals.

China's diplomatic backing is counterproductive to

Japanese efforts at improving relations with the Soviet Union
which, of course, is China's target.
The current negotiations to conclude a "treaty of peace

and friendship," as mandated by the 1972 Japan-China Joint
Statement, hinge on relations with the Soviet Union.

In fact,

disagreements encountered during the negotiation process have
47 peking Review XVII, No. 30 (1974), 17.
48 peking Review , XVII, No. 33 (1974), 18-19.
49 peking Review , XVIII, No. 7 (1975), 15.
,

"

67

more to do with the effect of the treaty on East Asian inter-

national relations than with Sino- Japanese relations.

China

has insisted upon including a clause in the treaty which would

warn third parties against attempting to establish hegemony
in East Asia, an obvious reference to the Soviet Union.

A

similar statement was placed in the 1972 Joint Statement, 50

although Japan has serious misgivings about agreeing to the

hegemony clause a second time, for fear of a further disruption in relations with the Soviet Union.

The impasse in

treaty negotiation with China, which resulted from disagree-

ment on the hegemony clause, indicates the constraints on
Japan's international relations, and the often diplomatically

vulnerable position from which Japan must support its foreign
policy initiatives.
Since normalizing diplomatic relations, China and Japan

have signed agreements on trade, aviation, navigation, and
fisheries, leaving only the peace treaty yet to be completed
5^
from among the tasks mentioned in the 1972 Joint Statement.

It is evident from the negotiations and final documents, however,

bUxhe pertinent sentence of the Joint Statement follows:
"Neither of the two countries should seek
hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region and
each country is opposed to efforts by any
other country or group to establish such
hegemony.
51 Peking Review XVII, No. 47 (1974), p. 4.
,
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that China has skillfully used the new
contacts with Japan to

achieve more important foreign policy goals.

The aviation

agreement, for example, was designed to further
isolate Taiwan.
As a condition for concluding the agreement,
Peking required a

Japanese public statement asserting the non-national
status of
the Taiwanese national flag carrier airline, China
Airlines. 52

Taiwan responded immediately by banning all Japan Air Line
aircraft from Taiwan

s

air space.

Although air flights have since

been resumed, by the creation of dummy airline companies to

avoid the national flag issue, China had won a diplomatic
victory.
The completion of a new pipeline from China's Taching oil

field to a tanker terminal at Chinwangtao,

a Yellow Sea port

within easy reach of Japan, indicates China's intention to
develop her position as an oil exporter.

In 1974 Japan im-

ported only 3% of her oil needs from China, although the volume
bought from China is expected to double in 1975.“*^

An expanded

oil output used to buy Japanese technology could establish a

5Z5TT statement to the press, Foreign Minister Ohira
said that, since 1972, Japan "has not considered the flag mark
of the aircraft belonging to Taiwan as something that represents a so-called national flag." The New York Times April
21, 1974.
53 The New York Times
February 10, 1975.
54The New York Times, March 11, 1975.
,

,
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permanent interest in stable relations for both Peking and
Tokyo.

imports,

However, Japan is already the largest source of Chinese
and the policy of self-sufficiency may prevent

Japan from vastly increasing its economic ties to China.

Historical and cultural ties, trade compatibility, close
geographical proximity, and most importantly, the absence of
any serious, outstanding issues, indicates that Japan will

improve relations with China faster than with the Soviet Union.

Although the present state of relations with China and the
Soviet Union supports this observation, Japan is well aware
of the need to maintain a minimum degree of equilibrium in

dealing with the two neighbors.

The diplomatic effort needed

to stay out of Sino-Soviet disputes and, at the same time,

improve relations with both nations may not be available to
the Japanese, thereby canceling the flexibility provided to

Japan by the Sino-Soviet rift.

Under the present circumstances

it will be extremely difficult for Japan to establish a stable

basis for continuing relations with either nation.

This is due

to the simple fact that in a triangular relationship, a move by

any two sides automatically affects the third.

External Trade Organization, White Paper on Inter national Trade Japan 1973 (n.p. Japan External Trade OrganizaIn 1971, Japan was responsible, for 20.27o
tion, 1973), p. 52.
of China's external trade.
5 5 japan

,
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Japan and the So-called Asian Quadrilateral

The increasingly flexible interaction of major power

interests in East Asia has prompted the use of the term 'Asian

quadrilateral' to describe an emerging regional balance of

A four-power balance, however,

power.

is not an accurate des-

cription of the Asian milieu to which Japan's foreign policy

must respond.

To begin with,

latent bipolarity still exists.

The United States and Soviet Union will remain the only two

military giants; this factor cannot simply be dismissed, even
though we are currently enjoying a period of relaxed tensions.
China places great emphasis on her growing military capability
and, as a nuclear power, commands respect from the two super-

On the other hand, Japan has chosen not to compete

powers.

militarily, hence cannot hold one comer of a four-power
balance.

China, the Soviet Union, and the United States con-

verge in Northeast Asia at Japan's doorstep.

Japan can either

develop her own military or depend on external military support.

Since the latter course was chosen, a quadrilateral

pattern cannot exist.
Soviet goals in Asia are suggestive of a containment policy

directed at China.

However, the notion of a balance of power

Soviet
implied in the quadrilateral is in reality replaced by a
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desire for predominance.

Moscow would like to insure its

security in the East; a mechanical balance of power could not
satisfy this goal.

There are other fixed points in the rela-

tions of the major powers, which place constraints upon the

operation of a flexible, balance of power.

The U.S.- Japan

relationship has undergone adjustments in recent years.

How-

ever, that relationship will remain a fairly constant part of

East Asian international relations.

Given the fundamental

nature of the dispute, Sino-Soviet relations will likely re-

main hostile.
The formation of more flexible relations among the four

major powers in Asia was a function of existing rivalries
rather than a permanent balance of power.

China has not

acknowledged any basic changes in the East Asian regional
setting, but has merely chosen to deal with the lesser evil
(U.S.) in order to strengthen her position against the major

adversary (U.S.S.R.).

Similarly, the existing ideological

differences, both within the Communist bloc, and, between

Japan and the United States on the one hand, and the Communist
nations, limits the development of a truly quadrilateral structure.

The quadrilateral, as a conceptual model of East Asian

international relations, cannot account for the root causes
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underlying the vicissitudes of Japan's regional
environment.
Also, reliance on balance of power is not supported
by the al-

liances and rivalries, some overlapping, which make up
major

power relations in East Asia:
U.S. -Japan alliance,

(1)

sino-Soviet rivalry,

(3) U.S., U.S.S.R.,

(2)

P.R.C. triangle,

(4)

Japan, U.S.S.R., P.R.C. triangle.
The importance of Korea is its crucial strategic position

between the four major powers, no one of which could tolerate
a united Korea under a hostile government.

Japan's relations

with South Korea have been severely strained due to the Kim
Dae Jung affair and the assassination of President Park's wife

during an attempt on Park's life by a Korean resident of
Japan.

56

Diplomatic relations between Japan and South Korea

were not established for two decades following World War II.

Japan refused to recognize the South Korean government as the
government of all Korea, keeping open the possibilities of

dealing with the North.

The South Korean position was that

Japan could not recognize the legitimacy of the North Korean
bb phe New YoriT~Times , June 16, 1974; August 19, 1974;
September 13, 1974. Kim Dae Jung ran against President Park
In August, 1973, he was kidnapped from
in the 1971 election.
Tokyo by South Korean agents and returned to Korea to stand
The attempted assassination was carried out by Mun
trial.
Se Kwang, a lifetime Korean resident of Japan who speaks only
Japanese, and who apparently has accomplices in Japan.

9
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government without causing the abrogation of its treaty with
the South.

Sufficiently ambiguous phraseology was used to

allow both Japan and South Korea their own interpretations.

Although Prime Minister Miki said that it is still "premature
for Japan to recognize the People's Democratic Republic of

Korea." 57 Japan has maintained unofficial contact with North

Korea and hopes to play a constructive role in the stabilization of the Korean peninsula.

S8

The growing tensions in Korea and the recent reaffirma-

tion by the United States of its commitment to protect South

Korea 5 ^ suggest that familiar elements of post-war inter-

national relations in East Asia remain.

Japan's interest in

stability in Northeast Asia will be overshadowed by ongoing

competition among the other three major powers.

Any war on

the Korean peninsula would automatically involve the United

States, and in turn implicate Japan.

Japanese foreign policy

options are limited by this situation.
Therefore, the Asian quadrilateral among major powers is
The new flexibility in East Asian international rela-

a myth.

57 japan Times "Weekly (International Edition), February
8, 1975.
58North Korea has already utilized the informal relations
with Japan to send messages to the United States. The New
York Times August 10, 1975.
,

5

6,

japan Times Weekly (International Edition), September

1975.
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tions can only describe certain
levels of interaction, and is

more appropriate to the position of
the lesser powers. 60

k^For the balance of power approach to East Asian international relations, see T. B. Millar, "The 'Asian Quadrilateral': An Australian View," Australian Outlook XXVII,
No. 2 (1973), pp. 134-139, and Hedley Bull, "The New Balance
of Power in Asia and the Pacific," Foreign Affairs
IL, No.
4 (1971), pp. 669-681.
,

,
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CHAPTER

IV

JAPAN AND SOUTH EAST ASIA:
THE DEVELOPING NATIONS

The

'North-South' Problem

Japan's relations with the developing nations of Southeast Asia are directly related to the 'North- South

'

problem.

Increasingly, the critical division in the world is between
the industrialized nations, concentrated in the Northern

Hemisphere (Japan, the United States, the Soviet Union, Western
Europe) and the poor nations, concentrated around the equator

and in the Southern Hemisphere.

As the East-West division of

the cold war becomes more complicated and less well-defined,
the

'

North- South

'

problem comes into focus.

Japan's sensitivity to the polarization of the 'have' and
'have-not' nations stems from a need to deal extensively with

both groups.

Culturally, historically, and geographically,

Japan has always identified more with Asian neighbors than with
the capitals of Western Europe.

Yet, as the only industrially

advanced Asian nation, Japan became a member of the Western,

rich-nation economic organizations during the 1960
first non-Western member of OECD.

's

and the

Japan's position in East

Asia is beset with contradictions, not the least of which

is
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how to establish a credible 'Asian-ness' and still continue
the necessarily close relations with the West.

Japan has

accomplished her post-war goal of catching up with the West.
The competitiveness of the Japanese economy has even led to
its characterization as one of three pillars of Western eco-

nomic strength.

Now, a stable basis for relations with the

developing nations must be found.

This will be a more formi-

dable goal for Japan to achieve.

Japan's unique position between North and South makes it

awkward to maintain close relations with both at the same time.
At the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-

ment (UNCTAD) in 1964, Japanese delegates attended strategy
sessions of both the industrialized nations and the southern

coalition of less developed nations, but were asked to leave
the sessions of the latter group.

^

of Japan's foreign policy problems:

This event indicates three
(1)

isolation,

(2)

finding

a suitable regional role, and (3) improving relations with the

developing nations.

The latter two are inseparable, because

developing a mutually acceptable relationship with Southeast
Asia is the key to successful relations with developing nations
"The Evolution of Japanese Eco1950-1970,"
in Pacific Basin Development:
nomic Cooperation
The American Interests ed. by Harold B. Malmgren (Lexington,
Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1972), p. 41.
ij. Alexander Caldwell,
,

.

77

in other regions.

that

Former Foreign Minister Kimura pointed out

there can be no such thing as Japanese foreign policy

toward developing countries without close relations with

Southeast Asian nations." 2
the

Thus the search for a solution to

'North-South' problem, as well as a stable Asian role,

will compel the Japanese to concentrate on Southeast Asian
relations

Foreign Aid
Japan's reemergence into Southeast Asia after the war was

initially spurred by the reparations agreements concluded with
nine countries of the area.

3

These agreements did not repre-

sent a foreign policy but an obligation written into the 1951
San Francisco Peace Treaty.

Ironically, the reparations pay-

ments were instrumental in establishing Japan as an economic
power in Southeast Asia.

4

There were also political factors

involved, since the payments improved the post-war image of
Japan.

Furthermore, a regional focus of foreign aid was estab-

Times Weekly (International Edition), July 27, 1974.
3Both the People's Republic of China and Taiwan chose not
The nine countries are: the
to present claims to Japan.
Philippines, Burma, Thailand, Laos, South Vietnam, Cambodia,
Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia. An agreement was also reached
with South Korea on reparations payments.
^Lawrence Olson, Japan in Postwar Asia (New York: Praeger
Publishers, 1970), p. 28.
2 Japan

.
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lished which continues to shape Japan's approach to Southeast

Asia
The 1960's was a period of transition during which the

earlier, uncoordinated reparations agreements developed into

more self-conscious efforts at building a foreign aid program
as an integral component of Japanese foreign policy.

The

stimulus for such a change came from growing criticism of

Japanese economic policy in Southeast Asia and the inevitable

political ramifications of the spiraling economic involvement.
Japan's foreign aid policy is a key area of her foreign policy
since the core of the

1

North- South

'

problem is contained in

the aid issue.

One of the first challenges to Japan's aid program, which

carried with it the moral force of an international organization, was the goal of 1% of national income as the minimum

annual net flow to developing countries, set by the first
UNCTAD. ^

The fact that Japan was the newest member of the

rich nations of the developed world, the only Asian member,
emphasis
and the fastest growing economic power, placed special
the
on Japan's aid-giving status, especially in the eyes of

would
developing nations of Southeast Asia, which collectively
policy.
be most affected by the specifics of Japan's aid

bibid

.

,

p

.

144.

Later

^
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conferences established a higher resource flow guideline of 1%
of gross national product.

In 1965 the Development Assistance

Committee of OECD called for an improvement in the quality of
foreign aid by suggesting a goal of

.

7%

of GNP for official

development assistance, or the more beneficial element of the
fl

outflow which could more accurately be labeled as 'aid.

'

More

recently DAC criticism of Japan concerned large loans to Iran.
Japan was reprimanded for offering loans to oil rich nations.
It is difficult for Japan to balance the foreign policy gains

to be made by selective aid-giving with the more general neces-

sity of adhering to the guidelines established by the developing

nations within international organizations.
Southeast Asia receives the largest share of Japanese aid

nearly

307>

of the total.

g

The Philippines and Indonesia top the

list of recipient countries in this region.

Central and South

America and the Middle East have begun to receive larger percentages of the total aid package, reflecting not only the oil
crisis and the expansion of capital used for resource projects,
but also aspects of Japanese foreign policy developed during

"japan's Foreign Policy," Australian Foreign Affairs
Record (May, 1973), p. 304.
T japan Times Weekly
(International Edition), January
6

18,

1975.

-

^Radha P. Sinha, "Japan's 'Aid' to Developing Countries,
World Development, II, No. 8 (1974), 17.
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the Tanaka prime ministership.
f ir^fid

policy

Although not a carefully de-

resources diplomacy followed from the need to

,

diversify the sources of crucial raw materials and lessen vulnerability.

One obvious result of the concern about exces-

sively concentrated economic commitments has been a slow decline in the importance of Southeast Asia.

As sources of raw

materials are diversified, so too will the pattern of foreign
aid be shifted.

Quantitatively, Japanese net outflow of resources is
second only to the United States.

The Japanese share in global

assistance has risen from 3.4% in 1962 to nearly 14% ten years
later. ^

In 1973 Japan more than doubled the 1962 $2730 mil-

lion figure by offering $5840 million in

aid.^

For the first

time, Japan surpassed the goal of 1% of GNP by reaching a
In the ten years from 1962 to 1972 Japanese

1.427o outflow.

assistance to developing countries increased 900%.^
The previous figures are not nearly as impressive when
the qualitative aspect of aid is considered.

The fact is,

that even the term ‘aid* is of questionable validity when ap-

plied to much of the net outflow of Japanese resources.
ficial development assistance (ODA)
^ Ihid

.

,

p

.

15

,

Of-

or resources of a conces-

.

Japan Report January 16, 1975, p. 5.
11-Sin ha, "Japan's 'Aid' to Developing Countries,"
,

p.

15.
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sionary nature assisting development, such as grants or longtern loans, was only 17% of the total outflow in 1973, down

from 22% in 1972. 12
0.25 in 1973,

13

As a percentage of GNP , Japan's ODA was

far short of the DAC goal of .7% and far down

in the list of OECD nations.

This poor showing in the quality

of aid is highlighted by the fact that from 1968 to 1972, 35%
of Japan's net outflow was export credits, as compared with
16%.

for West Germany and 5% for the United States.

Japan's aid pattern is an integral part of the total eco-

nomic strategy of dealing with resource needs and the necessity of trading to achieve foreign exchange with which to buy

more resources.

Much of the aid is tied to the purchase of

Japanese goods.

Often export development and foreign aid be-

come difficult to distinguish.

The result is that Japan bene-

fits from the aid as much if not more than the recipient.

For

example, development assistance categories important to de-

veloping nations, such as agriculture

(4.47.),

social infra-

structure (2.9%,), and technical assistance (5.5%) received

much less priority than energy and transport
rent export financing (40.4%,).^

(20.4%,)

and cur-

Therefore the increased

12 lbid
13 japan Report , January 16, 1975, p. 5.
14-sinha, "Japan's Aid to Developing Countries", p.
.

18.
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figures for overall Japanese aid only reveal increased trade

investment, not necessarily a real plan to cooperate with
the developing nations in solving the pressing issues of food

and development.
The close relationship between Japanese foreign aid, re-

sources procurement, and trade development has turned aid into
a controversial political issue.

The speed and manner with

which Japan answers the charges of the developing world and
softens the terms of aid, will determine Japan's future relations with Southeast Asia.
In response to the uncoordinated aid policy and to charges

that aid serves only Japan's economic interests, the government

created a new Agency for International Cooperation,^ which will
absorb the functions of several other groups and offices.

How-

ever, the two major governmental sources of loans for overseas

projects^ will continue

to operate independently,

the cosmetic nature of the new arrangement.

indicating

A more productive

proposal, although still only at the planning stage, is to es-

tablish consulting offices in six Southeast Asian countries to

work closely with local people in solving mutual problems rejapan Repor~ August 16, 1974.
l^These are the Import-Export Bank of Japan and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund. Hellmann, Japan and East Asia
^-5

p.

107.

,
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suiting from Japan's economic presence. 17

Such a policy is at

least the beginning of a unified way of thinking about relations with Southeast Asia.

If Japan does not design positive

aid programs based on broader political and regional concerns,

aid will continue to play a negative role by arousing the ani-

mosities of those it is supposed to help.

Multilateral Approaches to Southeast Asia
No longer can politics be separated from economics.

Japan's

political initiatives affect trade relations and vice versa.
Japan can no longer ignore the political repercussions resulting
from the transfer of industrial pollution to the developing
nations.

Charges of neo-colonialism levied against Japanese

multinational corporations must be handled in a political setHowever, Japan can not pursue a political leadership role,

ting.

Simply stated, Japan's foreign

or any position of predominance.

policy toward Southeast Asia must assume responsibility but
avoid domination.

Policy remaining within these bounds can be

most effectively accomplished in a multilateral context.
Participation in the founding of the Asian Development Bank
was a major Japanese effort to assume a responsible position in
the solution of regional problems.
1/F

Japan Times Weekly

,

March

1,

Although there were thirty1975.
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one original members in 1966, Japan pledged
20% of the first
$1 billion capital

ADB President.

fund.^

A Japanese was chosen to be first

However, on the issue of where the ADB head-

quarters should be located, hard Japanese lobbying was unable
to convince the membership that Tokyo would be the best place,

and Manila was chosen instead.

The prevailing view at the

time, among the developing nations, that the ADB should be an

Asian, not a Japanese, institution,"^ suggests that Japan over-

stepped the limits of political responsibility by attempting
to develop constructive initiatives into a position of leader-

ship.

Even though only symbolic, such a position was not

tolerated.

Also in 1966, Japan was the principal organizer of the

Annual Ministerial Conference for the Economic Development of
Southeast Asia.

Although its functions are primarily eco-

nomic, Japan proposed the annual conference in light of political instability in Southeast Asia, with the hope that economic

economic development would have a stabilizing effect.

The

Eighth Ministerial Conference was held in Tokyo in October,
1973, attended by all Southeast Asian nations except North
ia Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy , p. 187.
19 Caldwell, "Japanese Economic Cooperation," p. 43.

20 Ibid.

"
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Vietnam, including normally neutral Burma, and Australia and
o

New Zealand.

1

Prime Minister Tanaka's trip to Southeast Asia in January,
1974 triggered demonstrations in Bangkok and severe riots in

Jakarta.

The cause was alleged economic domination and ex-

ploitation. 22

Figures for 1971, however, reveal that in the

five ASEAN nations, the United States had invested $1662 mil-

lion while Japan's direct investment was only $489 million. 22
It is not the economic presence alone which sparks the enmity

toward Japan, but the visibility of the Japanese investments,

concentrated in consumer goods, and therefore subject to high
r\ /

levels of advertisement.

Thus the real problems may be re-

lated to style and image, and the inherent asymmetry between

Japan and the nations of Southeast Asia.

Commenting on the

Tanaka trip, Richard Halloran of the New York Times concluded
"that the issues causing friction between Japanese and Southeast

Asians were not economic but political, psychological and

nationalist

.

25

Zi Japan Report , February 16, 1974 (special supplement),
p. 1-2.
22 The New York Times
January 21, 1974.
23 Yoshihiro Tsurumi, "Multinational Spread of Japanese
Firms and Asian Neighbor's Reactions," a paper submitted to
Yale University Conference on "The Multinational Corporation
,

as an Instrument of Development-Political Considerations,
(mimeo), p. 3.
2 4 Ibid
p. 28-29.
,
2 The New York Times, January 21, 1974.
.

86

The formation of ASEAN in 1967 represented a departure

from earlier attempts at regional organization.

Indonesia's

participation erased the apparent Western bias of earlier
O£

groups

.

The significance of the new regionalism is that

ASEAN is the first "general, indigenous, and politically
neutral"

organization in Southeast Asia.

The ASEAN nations

talk collectively to international organizations such as GATT,

and there is a permanent ASEAN office in Brussels to deal with
the European Economic Community.

Beyond these small begin-

nings, the group of five nations has made little progress toward

integrating the region's economy or forming a supranational

political authority.

The point here is that ASEAN indicates a

growing political awareness among the nations of Southeast Asia,

which will be an increasingly important factor of the regional
setting.

It was no coincidence that Prime Minister Tanaka's

Southeast Asian tour led him to Manila, Bangkok, Kuala Lumpur,
Singapore, and Jakarta, the five ASEAN capitals.

Two members of the Association of Southeast Asia
Thailand and the Philippines were linked to SEATO; the
(ASA)
third - Malaysia - was closely associated with Britain.
^Bernard K. Gordon, "Common Defense Considerations and
Integration in Southeast Asia," in Regional International
Organizations: Structures and Functions, ed. by Paul Tharp,
Jr. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1971), p. 243.
28pick Wilson, "Economic Co-operation within ASEAN,"
Pacific Community V, No. 1 (1973), 81.
zt)

-

,

.
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In 1971 the ASEAN governments proposed that Southeast
Asia

be recognized as

a zone of peace,

freedom and neutrality free

from any form or manner of interference from outside powers." 29
The goal has not been realized, although the end of hostilities
in Indochina led to renewed efforts among the ASEAN nations to

draft a more constructive proposal. 30

Japan favors the idea

since stability in the region would be enhanced.

It is clear

that the slow but steady maturity of ASEAN precludes a heightened

Japanese presence in Southeast Asia.

The proposal indicates the

desire to rid the areAxjf disruptive major power influence

-

and

this would include Japan as well.

Internal conflicts continue to plague ASEAN, such as the

ongoing rift between the Philippines and Malaysia.

However,

ASEAN may act as a deterrent to external interference in the
area.

Two ASEAN nations have taken steps to weaken or end the

military relationship with the United States.

There is also a

discussion among ASEAN members of expanding the regional organization to include Burma and the nations of Indochina.

31

An

expanded ASEAN would be a political entity better equipped to
confront Japan on specific economic issues.

On the other hand,

the mere existence of the organization may force Japan to develop
29 Ibid
80
p
30 The New York Times , May 10, 1975; May 14, 1975.
3 ^The New York Times, May 14, 1975.
.

,

.
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a more comprehensive, regional approach to the
solution of

problems, in a multilateral context.

Japan's economic interests and diplomatic efforts are

globally diversified and will become more so.

This trend will

preclude any exclusive relationship with Southeast Asia, even
though 24.27o of Japan's total exports and 20.87, of its total
imports are with the region. 32

Japan's Southeast Asian policy

will be watched closely by the Group of 77 developing nations.
The 'North-South' problem is potentially one of Japan's most

difficult diplomatic issues.

If the advantage should continue

to shift in favor of resource-holding nations,

the state of

relations with Southeast Asia will become even more crucial.
It is important to note, however,

that Japan must deal with

her southern neighbors as an outsider.

The Pacific Basin and Australia

The heterogeneous nature of the nations in the East Asian

area makes it difficult for Japan to establish a regionally

based foreign policy.

The suspicion of Japan's economic power

is linked to memories of a Japanese dominated Greater East

Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

In the 1970's Japan is too big and

Japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on Inter national Trade, Japan 1974, p. 9-10.
J

,

.
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ths na-tions of Southeast Asia too small

factory relationship.

foir

a mutually satis-

An alternative approach to Japan's

'North- South' problem in East Asia would be to deal with the

developing nations as a member of a group of nations with similar interests in maintaining and improving relations in this

area

A 'Pacific Basin' group

.

One possibility is for Japan to

coordinate policy with the developed nations of the Pacific
Basin

-

the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

A leading exponent of this idea has concentrated on the economic benefits.

The U.S., Australia, and Canada are three

of Japan's leading resource suppliers, and the U.S. and Canada
are major markets for Japanese products.

Kiyoshi Ko j ima argues

that the five nations have common goals in promoting economic

integration.

His chief concern is protectionism in the United

States and the Common Market.

By drawing the United States

into a Pacific Free Trade Area, and thereby providing a means
of combating the European Economic Community, Ko j ima reasons
that both trouble spots would be alleviated.

3

/

b^Kiyoshi Kojima, Japan and a Pacific Free Trade Area
(London: MacMillan, 1972).
^Kiyoshi Kojima, "Chances for a Pacific Free Trade Area,"
Intereconomics No. 6 (June 1972), p. 184.
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All the nations in question are developed, capitalistic
economies; all are ideologically linked with the West; all have

similar political systems with free elections and representative assemblies.

Furthermore, a Pacific Basin group would be

in an ideal position to coordinate comprehensive aid programs

for Southeast Asia.

Japan's isolated position in dealing with

the Southeast Asian nations would be buttressed.

However, the

only ongoing consultation among the Pacific Basin nations is
in the form of a privately organized Pacific Basin Economic

Cooperation Council set up in 1968.^
Even if the other nations were willing, serious partici-

pation in a Pacific Basin group would be beyond the bounds of
plausible Japanese foreign policy.

Although there are barriers

to close regional ties in East Asia,

neighbors.

Japan cannot ignore her

Japan is located in East Asia and cannot but have

an effect on the economic, political, and strategic spheres of

Formation of a Pacific

East Asian international relations.

Basin group would exacerbate Japanese efforts to improve her
image as an East Asian nation, determined to bridge the gap

between North and South.

Also Japan must diversify sources of

dbwarr en Reed, "An Era of Interdependence: Australia and
Japan Today, " The Japan Interpreter IX, No. 1 (1974), 48.
,
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raw materials and markets for exports, rather than consolidate
them.

Australia

.

Expansion of relations with Australia is a

more credible means of establishing a regional policy, which
does not disturb the integrity of Japan's requirements else-

where in the world.

Australia is in the process of changing

the focus of economic and political ties from Western Europe
to East Asia.

Besides the obvious economic compatibility of

Australian natural resources and Japanese technology and
finished goods, the two nations, as the two major developed
countries of the region, are in a good position to initiate

joint programs of foreign aid.

While addressing a joint

Ministerial meeting in October, 1973, Prime Minister Gough

Whitlam noted the reason for Australian- Japanese cooperation:
"There are few nations in the world whose fundamental interests
O (1

coincide so clearly as those of Japan and Australia."

Australia's recognition of China, unwillingness to be
linked to the anti- communis t image of the now moribund Asian
and Pacific Council, and desire to maintain friendly relations

with all nations in East Asia, parallel Japan's foreign policy
in the region.

Negotiations were begun in 1973 for a treaty

which would develop the political relations between Japan and

^The New York

Times, October 31, 1973.

7
8

.
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Australia. 3 7

This alliance is one of the few open to Japan

which would not irritate other elements of the general region,
especially if designed to coordinate foreign aid to Southeast
Asia, and not as a threat to China.

At the 1973 meeting, Prime

Minister Whitlam also said:
As the two most developed industrial nations
of the West Pacific, we share a common
interest in the well-being of our region, so
populous and so poor. We have a common
interest in seeing that our region does not
become an area for competition or confrontaOO
tion between the great powers.-30

Closer relations between Japan and Australia based on these

principles would serve Chinese interests by implicitly deterring Soviet- sponsored collective security in East Asia.

Regardless of the advantages of a broader alliance, the
focus of the relationship remains economic.

imports come from Australia,

39

1973.^°

3.27,

507o

Australia is a

of Japanese exports in

The economic ties with Australia are hampered by a

staggering degree of resource dependency.
buys

Japan's

now the second largest indi-

vidual supplier, after the United States.

medium sized market accepting

9.17, of

For example, Japan

of industrial coal, manganese, and bauxite, and

3

.

3

.

367,

Ibid
ibid
39 japan External Trade Organization, White Paper on Inter
national Trade, Japan 1974 p. 10.
4 0 Ibid , p 9
,

.

.
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or iron ore from Australia. 41

Australia has been unwilling to

grant further Japanese investment in resource-related industries , fearing excessive Japanese control of mineral properties
in Australia.

The annual

Ministerial Committee meeting is still the only

formal contact to guide bilateral relations.

Without a more

stable foundation on which to conduct hard economic bargaining,

more constructive Japanese -Australian relations are unlikely.

Conclusions
We return to the three questions posed at the outset of

chapter III.

First, will East Asia become the primary focus

of Japan's foreign policy?

Japan's interests cannot be satis-

fied, and in fact would be damaged by a purely regional foreign

Japanese economic power is too dispersed and has too

policy.

many requirements to remain healthy in a primarily Asian setting.

Former Foreign Minister Ohira spoke of the dangers to

Japan "posed by the rise
regions

-

-

both in developed and developing

of economic nationalism, protectionism, regionalism,

and exclusive trading arrangements."

42

Therefore Japan cannot

take part in regional strategies to the detriment of, in many
4i Koji Nakamura, "Australia Gives Nothing Away," Far
Eastern Economic Review , LXXXII, No. 44 (1973), 39.'
4^ Japan Report , June 16, 1974, p. 4.
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cases, equally necessary relations in other parts of the world.

Japan is an alien in Southeast Asia, and an important strategic

element of major power calculations in Northeast Asia.
are no natural partners for Japan in Asia.

There

This is not to

suggest that Japan will not have a role to play in East Asia

-

rather that the region cannot be the foundation upon which
Japan's position in the world is based.

It will be necessary,

however, for Japan to develop a closer understanding with the

nations in East Asia.

The lack of recognizable goals and the

appearance of a drifting Japanese foreign policy is particularly unsettling to the countries of Southeast Asia which are

most affected by economic relations with Japan.
Second, how will the position in Asia affect Japan's

global foreign policy options?

The regional setting has im-

portant extra-regional implications.

Relations with Southeast

Asia will have an impact on Japan's dealings with developing
nations world-wide.

In Northeast Asia,

the line between the

regional and global implications of the interaction of the

major powers is hardly distinguishable.

Japan's global foreign

policy is weakened by the absence of a firm regional basis for

diplomatic strength.

One observer has written that "Japan's

lack of a regional basis is without doubt her weakest point.
4JKosaka. Options for Japan's Foreign Policy

,

p.

24.

.
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Japan's foreign policy options globally will be affected by the

weak regional position.

Japan is important to Asia; the solu-

tion to regional problems will have to involve Japan to a

greater extent.

However, Japan will not be able to extract

from East Asia support for diplomatic ventures elsewhere.

will Japan pursue an Asian leadership position or
opt for partnership with the West?

Asia

-

Japan's interests in East

stability, open and safe waterways, access to a constant

supply of raw materials and stable markets for Japanese goods,
and freedom from disputes of the major powers

divergent from global foreign policy goals.

may not coincide with either alternative.

-

are in no way

Japan's interests

Japan has been des-

cribed as a "multi- dimensional power," both Asian and Western,

with truly global interests.

Such a characterization explains

Japan's unique position in East Asia.

Japan is isolated from

participation in East Asian politics as an insider, yet the
region is vitally important to Japanese contact with the world.
Japan's foreign policy has moved beyond geography, although
in the foreseeable future East Asia will present the Japanese

with their most difficult foreign policy problems.

There are

constraints against being primarily a Western partner or pri-

marily an Asian leader.
alternative

Japan will have to find a third
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CHAPTER

V

THE JAPANESE SECURITY DILEMMA

Japan is approaching a crossroads in defense policy.
The decisions regarding the future disposition of the Mutual

Security Treaty with the United States and the Non-Proliferation Treaty will be as important as any in defining the type
of relationship Japan chooses to build with other nations.

Will Japan decide to continue as the only economic superpower
lacking a corresponding military potential, or will Japan opt
for an independent defense capacity with the accompanying

decision to manufacture nuclear weapons?

Although the existing

security dilemma is much more complex, decisions Japan will

make in the next few years will either reject the military as
an instrument of foreign policy, as is now done, or begin the

development of a Japanese controlled military potential with
applications beyond Japanese territory.
The following issues will be discussed in this chapter:
(1)

the Self-Defense Forces,

(2)

the strategic environment,

the U.S.- Japan Security Treaty, and (4) nuclear weapons.

The Self-Defense Forces

A consideration of the Japanese military must begin with
Constituthe 'Renunciation of War' Article from the Japanese
tion.

^
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Article 9
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order,
the Japanese people forever renounce war as
a sovereign right of the nation and the threat
or use of force as means of settling international disputes.
In order to accomplish the aim of the
preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces
as well as other war potential, will never be
maintained. The right of belligerency of the
state will not be recognized.
.

The fact that there do exist land, sea and air forces in spite

of the Constitution is explained by their designation as

'self-defense' forces.

"The inherent right of individual or

collective self-defence," as guaranteed in article 51 of the

United Nations Charter is affirmed in the preamble to the
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, and forms the legal
basis for the Japanese military.

Nevertheless, Article

9

is

an effective limitation on the role of the armed forces.
In 1956 the Diet created a National Defense Council to

give advice to tt^ Cabinet on security matters.

The Council

established the first Basic National Defense Policy, which in
part was
to gradually build up effective forces to
provide the minimum degree of defense necessary in accord with national strength and

national sentiment.

Although the policy was noncommital, it did indicate that
Japan would "gradually" increase its conventional armed forces,
1 Lane don.

Japan's Foreign Policy

,

p.

37.

.
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leaving open

tine

question of

tine

In accordance with this policy,

future role of the military.
the Defense Council designed

the First Defense Buildup Plan which called for $1.2 billion

for domestic production of weapons, including domestic assembly

of jet fighters, over a three-year period ending in 1960.

The

plan was also designed to replace the American ground troops

being withdrawn with a larger Japanese ground force.
The Second Defense Buildup Plan (1962-1966) was devised
to replace outdated equipment and increase the size of the
O

three forces, ground, sea, and air.

$3.9 billion

was spent

on the Air Self-Defense Force fighter plane, the F104J, expan-

sion of domestic production of

modem

arms, purchase of ad-

vanced air defense systems including Nike and Hawk surface-toair missiles, and, for the Maritime Self-Defense force, heli-

copter carriers and anti-submarine escort vessels.

3

Whereas the aim of the first two buildup plans was to
improve the armed forces quantitatively, the goal for the third

and fourth plans was to deal with the qualitative aspects.

A

five-year plan from 1967 to 1972 stressed research, advanced
training, and a strengthened air and submarine defense.

An

William Morley, "Economism and Balanced Defense,"
in Forecast for Japan: Security in the 1970*5 ed. by James
William Morley (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972),
2 James

,

p

.

11

3"The Evolution of Japan's Defense Plans," The Japan
Interpreter, VIII, No. 2 (1973), 213.

.
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important aspect of the third plan was the achievement of the
goal of

domestic production of all arms, unaided by the

907o

United States.

The Japanese policy was to continue to rely

on the U.S. security treaty, but to place Japanese conventional

forces on a more independent basis.

was $6.5 billion,

5

The cost of the third plan

or nearly double the cost of the second plan.

The fourth and current five-year plan, which will run

through 1976, is projected to cost $15 billion, for new fighter

planes and an increase in maritime forces to enable adequate

protection of Okinawa, returned to full Japanese administration in 1972.

However, serious economic problems may prevent

completion of the procurement schedule by the March 1977 deadline.

6

The present Defence Agency Director Michita Sakata has

already set in motion the drafting of a defense program to follow the present one

.

^

Present policy suggests that Japan will

continue to develop and manufacture equipment for its modem

conventional armed forces.
Even though modernization and expansion programs, along

with inflation, have raised the 1974 defense budget to more than
^ Ibid

.

,

p

.

216

^Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy p. 118.
Times Weekly (International Edition), July 5,
,

6 Japan

1975.
7 Japan

1975.

Times Weekly (International Edition), June 28,
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ten times the level of 1954, the budget as a percentage of

GNP (table I) has steadily declined from a high of 1.7% in

1954 to .8% in 1973.

Japanese Cabinets have supported a 1%

upper limit, although it is doubtful whether it will be possible to maintain the present trend without weakening the
SDF.

The reason is that the phenomenonal Japanese economic

growth rate has been muted; no longer will the expanding defense budget be outdistanced by an even greater increase in
GNP.

For the SDF to continue to develop, or even modernize

the existing forces as new military technology is made avail-

able, a larger percentage of GNP will have to be devoted to
the military.

The defense expenditures as a percentage of the national

budget (table

I)

is another declining trend which may level

off or be reversed if the SDF continues to develop at the present
pace.

These figures suggest that the military decisions of the

next few years will be economically as well as politically difficult ones.

Assertions that Japan could build a major military

force, possibly even acquire nuclear weapons, while maintaining

validity.
the less than 1% of GNP defense budget are losing their

A comparison of national military establishments reveals
of GNP is least
that Japan's defense expenditure as a percentage

among major nations (Table II).

The figures for three European

:

:
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TABLE

I

JAPAN'S DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

1

fisc

year
1954
1955
1956
1957
1958
1959
1960
1961
1962
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974

Defense
Budget
($ million)
375
375
397
399

412
432
444
510
594
688
780
846
959
1075

1172
1375
1640
2252
2601
3530 a
3835 a

2

Defense
Budget
7o of GNP
1.73
1.52
1.44
1.28
1.26
1.14
.99
.92
.99
.97
.95
.94
.91
.86
.80
.79
.81
.88
.88
a
8
.

-

3

4

Defense
Budget: 70
of national
Budget

GNP
($

21.7
24.6
27.6
31.2
32.7
37.8

-

10.9
9.0
9.0
9.0
8.50
8.05
8.49
8.24
7.74
7.47
7.28
7.22
7.16

45.0
55.1
60.2
71.0
82.0
90.7
105.9
124.3
146.6
174.2
203.4
255.3
285.7

23
b
6 78
b
6 55
7

billion)

.

.

-

.

-

-

columns 1,2,4

Kunio Muroaka, Japanese Security and
the United States, Adelphi Papers No
95 (London: IISS, 1973), Table 1, p. 34.
column 3
F.C. Langdon, Japan's Foreign Policy
(Vancouver: University of British
Columbia Press, 1973), Table 6.1, p. 118
a IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975 (London: IISS
1974), p. 79.
b Japan Report, November 16t, 1974, p. 6
•

.
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TABLE II

COMPARATIVE NATIONAL DEFENSE FIGURES

4

12

Defense Expenditure

1974
$

million

3

1973
% of GNP

Country

1973
$ per

capita

Sweden
Switzerland
West Germany
France
Britain
Czechoslovakia
JAPAN
Australia
Indonesia
South Korea
India
U.S.S.R.
U.S.
Israel
source:

3

1641
884
13588
7913
8721
1384
3835
1907
452
558
2443
33056
85800
3688

3.1
1.7
2.9
3.1
4.9
3.8
.8

3.3
3.2
3.8
3.1
5.4
6.2
47.8

211
122
182
162
155
92
32
144
4
14
4
134
377
1310

IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975
a p. 78-79.
kp. 82.
c

p.

^p.

30.
56.

Total
armed
forces
as %

of men
of military age^
5.5
-

4.0
4.9
3.4
6.8
.9

2.6
1.5
-

.9

6.8
5.5
23.5
(London:

5

Total
armed
^
0
forces
86,100
42,500 c
490,000
502,500
345,300
200,000
233,000
68,851
270,000
d
625 000
956,000
3,525,000
2,174,000
145,500
,

IISS, 1974).
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countries (France, West Germany, and Sweden), for example, hover

around 3%, while for the East Asian examples of Australia, Indonesia, and South Korea, the figure is 3.3%, 3.2%, and 8%

respectively.

The per capita expenditure of defense funds

(table II) in the three selected European nations is between

five and six times the corresponding figure in Japan ($32.).

Australia spends $144 per capita while Indonesia spends only $4.
This statistic must be used in conjunction with total population.

For example, Australia, with a population of somewhat more than
one eighth the population of Indonesia, would have to spend far

more per capita to develop a similar military system.
Column 4 of table II suggests the commitment made to national defense, in the form of the percentage of men of military age

Again, Japan has a very low percentage

in the armed forces.

(.9) compared with Sweden’s 5.5%, or West Germany's 4%.

This

figure, and the total armed forces statistic (table II, column

which
5), do not reflect the all-important qualitative element,

determines the effectiveness of a given military force.

The

233,000 personnel of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces makes up
of
a more potent fighting potential than do the 270,000 people

are involved
the Indonesian military, more than one- third of whom
,
in administrative duties.
.

8

»The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Ike
Military Balance 1974-1975 (London: IISS, 1974), p. 54.
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Although Japan spends little relative to GNP in building
the defense force, in absolute terms the budget (table 110 is

the seventh largest in the world.

Were Japan to raise the

budget level to only 2% of GNP, the military budget would surpass the Europeans to become the third largest in the world. 9

Japan's military strength is far below its potential relative
to the size of the economy and the expertise of Japan's tech-

nology, but it can not be considered insignificant in any

absolute sense.

It is also the consensus of most observers

that, given the advanced level of technology, Japan could

easily become a major military power in a number of years,

although the domestic political constraints are more significant than the technical ones.
The present fighting potential of Japan's military forces,

however, is limited, especially in total mobilized strength.^
The Japanese Self-Defense Forces are 230,000 strong, but with

only 39,000 reserves and no national system of conscription.

Sweden can mobilize 750,000 troops, while Switzerland can call

625,000 within 48 hours.

South Korea is a special case given

However, there

the constant threat at the demilitarized zone.

^Swadesh R. DeRoy, "Prospects for Militarism in Japan,"
Pacific Community V, No. 2 (1974), 300.
J-^The comparative military figures in this paragraph are
taken from IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975 pp. 29-30,
55-57.
,

,
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are over

1

million reservists and a special

2

million member
\

local Militia Homeland Defense Reserve Force.

In combat air -

craft Japan's combined Maritime and Air Force total of 495 is
less than twice the Swiss number (290)

,

but one-hundred less

than the number of Swedish combat aircraft (600).

The Japanese

navy also has fewer submarines than Sweden (15 and 20, respectively), although Japan is well ahead in submarine defense vessels and destroyers.
In 1971 Defense Agency Director Nakasone listed four limi-

tations to the development of the defense forces:

stitutional limit (Article 9),

(2)

1^

(1)

Con-

political limit (government

pledge not to obtain nuclear weapons),

(3)

operational limit

(defense of Japanese territory only), and (4) equipment limit

(offensive weapons prohibited).

Continued enforcement of these

limitations will depend on the external environment and the
seriousness of perceived threats to Japanese security.

The Strategic Environment

The significance of the Japanese military is put in proper

perspective when set against the powerful forces based on the
12
Asian mainland and in the nearby waters of the Pacific.

Al-

"Japan: The Year of the Shock," p. 53.
The comparative military figures in this paragraph are
taken from IISS, The Military Balance 1974-1975 pp. 8-10,
48-50, 74-75.

^Farnsworth

,

,
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though the Soviet Union has not yet deployed
extensive army or

air force units on the Pacific coast, 45 army
divisions and

one-fourth of the tactical Air Force are placed
along the SinoSoviet border and could presumably be diverted
eastward.

Soviet air forces have 5350 combat aircraft.

The

Of greater rele-

vance, however, is the Pacific fleet of the Soviet
navy, which

includes some 100 submarines (40 nuclear) and 55 surface
com-

bat ships.
Until the middle 1960's, defense planners in Japan viewed
the Soviet Union as the main threat to Japanese security.

The

P.R.C. had not yet developed a military potential which could

have posed a danger.

The easing of tensions between the United

States and the Soviet Union has diminished the apprehension

about a Soviet Attack.

Moscow has become a status quo power

by wishing to freeze existing boundaries with China and refusing to reopen the territorial dispute with Japan.

However,

the present period of relief from the danger of bipolar con-

frontation, tends to heighten the irritation of local discord.
The disagreement over the disputed Northern Territories is, if

anything, growing in intensity since both sides adamantly refuse to alter their positions.

The fact that some of the is-

lands in question are within sight of Hokkaido, and the constant

contact between the Soviet navy and Japanese fishermen in the

^
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area, suggests that strategic planning in Japan will continue
to focus on the Soviet Union.

Soviet air bases have been es-

tablished on the two larger islands, Etorofu and Kunashiri,

ensuring Soviet control of the islands and surrounding region.
Entrance to the Sea of Okhotsk can be restricted, and Soviet

naval vessels are guaranteed undisturbed passage into the
Pacific Ocean.
The Chinese navy maintains a low visibility in East Asia,

although it has grown substantially to a force of 230,000 personnel with more than 50 submarines and a naval air force of

600 combat aircraft.

The navy, like the infantry-based army,

is designed for defense and is not equipped to carry out major

offensive operations.

However, in manpower the navy is now the

third largest in the world,

^

reflecting the concerns about the

large Soviet fleet in the Pacific.

It has been argued that

with the transfer of major threats from a bipolar framework to
a regional subsystem, Japan's major security problem would shift
to China.

^

The u.S. presence in the Pacific, however, remains

firm, providing China with the assurance that Japan will not

feel the need to rearm.

Also Tokyo's concerns about the Soviet

lb James Simon, "Japan's 'Ostpolitik' and the Soviet Union,"
World Today , XXX, No. 4 (1974), 161-162.
l ^The New York Times , August 10, 1975.

l^Hellmann, "The Confrontation with 'Realpolitik
144.

'

"

,

p.

.
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Union during the cold war were not based solely on cold war
tensions, but on several bilateral difficulties mentioned

above

Although the Soviet Union is still more of a threat to
Japan than China, Japanese security policy will be affected

more directly by the dynamics of the major-power triangle in
East Asia, than by China or the Soviet Union individually.
The relationship of the three major powers in Asia, as dis-

cussed in chapter III, provides Japan with a certain measure
of security.

However, it is a security which binds Japan to

external events.

A disintegration in the environment could

effect a drastic change in Japan's security policy.
The most serious general security problem for Japan is the

danger of being drawn into a conflict on the Korean peninsula,

where the interests of all of the major powers in Asia overlap.
Once the communist forces in Indochina achieved complete success, it was natural that tension would shift to Northeast

Asia, where the dilemma of a divided Korea remains unresolved.

Japan could not avoid becoming directly linked to hostilities
in Korea, especially since American forces stationed in South

Korea are there in support of the U.S. commitment to Japan as

well 16
.

1(3

The New York Times, May 23, 1975.

^
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A Korea unified under President Kim would present Japan
with a new communist neighbor.
to Japan

s

A victorious South would add

insecurity as well, since a unified Korea would have

an armed force much larger than Japan's.

Acceptance of the

status quo in Korea is the best alternative in terms of Japan's
security, since South Korea acts as a buffer between Japan and

China while reducing the military challenge from Korea.

The

fact that Japan has granted de facto legitimacy to North Korea

through unofficial talks on trade and other matters, lends
credence to the idea that Japan would prefer to develop friendly

relations with both halves of a divided Korea.

When President Kim of North Korea travelled to Peking in
April 1975 for a state visit, he sought support for a return to

belligerency toward the South.

Mr. Kim's opening speech out-

lined the chances for war.
If revolution takes place in South Korea, we,
as one and the same nation, will not just look
at it with folded arms but will strongly supIf the enemy
port the South Korean people.

ignites war recklessly, we shall resolutely
answer it with war and completely destroy the
aggressors
.

However, the communique, while continuing general support for
the North Koreans, cautioned against resort to war to achieve
^

Peking Review

,

XVIII, No. 17 (1975), 17.
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North Korean goals of reunification and elimination of
American
forces from the Korean peninsula.
The Chinese side reaffirms its resolute support to the Korean people in their just struggle for the independent and peaceful reunification of their fatherland. 1 ^ [emphasis added]
It is unlikely that North Korea would instigate a new armed

conflict with the South without promises of support from China
or the Soviet Union.

Yet, it is even more unlikely that either

communist neighbor would lend such support to President Kim,
for fear of damaging relations with the United States.

Three points should be noted regarding the external set-

ting of security policy.

First, the security issue for Japan

is strictly a regional one.

Unlike other aspects of Japanese

foreign policy, military policy is confined to East Asia,

especially Northeast Asia.

Although there is some discussion

about the protection of shipping lines and guaranteeing passage through international straits, it would be folly for Japan
to attempt to solve these issues with military, rather than

diplomatic, policy.
Second, the external environment is characterized by the

lack of any serious threats to the security of Japan.

China

and the Soviet Union are both attempting to woo Japan away from
IS peking Review , XVIII, No.

18

(1975), 9.
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the other, while constraints have been placed on armed conflict

as a means of settling the Korean situation.

Third, Japan's armed forces are insignificant compared to
the military potential available to China and the Soviet Union.

This explains the emphasis placed on the U.S. military presence
in Northeast Asia and the security treaty with the United States.

The U.S. -Japan Mutual Security Treaty

The 1960 Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, a

revision of the 1951 Security Treaty, is the basis for the

American defense commitment to Japan.

For Japan the advantages

of the treaty are obvious: a guarantee of security, a low de-

fense budget, and an East Asia reassured about Japanese motives,

because of the American military presence in Japan.

In return,

the United States is permitted to have bases in Japan, not only

for the benefit of Japan, but to protect American interests in

East Asia.
There are no external developments at present which could

endanger Japan's defense as long as the security relationship

with the United States is in operation.

Reliance on the treaty

has been a constant theme of foreign policy statements ema-

nating from Japan and a cornerstone of its foreign policy.
Problems associated with the treaty and the extent to which

.
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Japan continues to place faith in the security relationship

with the United States, will be important determinants of the
future direction of Japanese defense policy.
The 1951 Security Treaty was much different from the 1960

revision now in force.

The belief by some Japanese that the

treaty was the price to be paid for the return of sovereignty,
and that it was a one-sided treaty, fueled the fierce opposition to the revision

-

and continuation

to the United States in 1960.

-

of the security tie

The original treaty made no

specific U.S. commitment to guarantee the security of Japan.

Furthermore, Japan was given no voice in the deployment of U.S.
forces in Japan.

Consultative mechanisms did not exist to deal

with other matters of American defense policy in Asia which
might affect Japan.

According to the treaty, U.S. forces were

authorized to quell internal disturbances, and were required to
be stationed in Japan, factors which suggested to many a con-

tinuation of the occupation.

Japan wanted the treaty to be

linked to the U.N. Charter and to reflect a more mutual approach

with duties and obligations falling to both sides.

A further

difference of opinion surrounded the period the treaty would
remain in force.

The 1951 treaty was to continue until both

governments agreed to terminate it, thus giving the United States
of
a right to station troops in Japan for an unlimited period

time
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The revision in 1960 incorporated many of the Japanese

objections to the earlier treaty.

The preamble and four of ten

articles refer specifically to principles and functions of the

United Nations, in the event of an "armed attack against either
Party.

19

As for the issue of mutual consultation, the title

of the treaty was changed from 'Security Treaty Between the

United States and Japan,' to 'Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and
Security Between the United States and Japan.

Article IV

'

called for the parties to "consult together from time to time

regarding the implementation of this treaty.

The formation

of the Security Consultative Committee resulted from further
O

discussions about the mandate of Article IV,

1

creating for the

first time a regular channel for the coordination of mutual

security problems.

In addition, an exchange of notes accom-

panying the treaty stated that changes in deployment of U.S.
troops or the use of military bases "shall be the subjects of

prior consultation with the government of Japan.

„22

In the present treaty, U.S. forces are not required to be

stationed in Japan, and no longer does internal security fall
19"Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the
United States and Japan," in Hellmann, Japan and East Asia
Appendix B, p. 198.
20 lbid
2lLangdon, Japan's Foreign Policy p. 40..
22 M Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security," p. 200.
,

.

,

.
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within the jurisdiction of the United States.

The U.S. defense

commitment is contained in Article V.
Each Party recognizes that an armed attack
against either Party in the territories under
the administration of Japan would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares
that it would act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional provisions and processes. 23

Japan is required to respond only to an attack against Japanese
territory, thus remaining within the bounds set by the Con-

stitution, which, as interpreted by the Japanese, prohibits

forces for any purpose other than self-defense.

In 1970, both

nations allowed the treaty to automatically extend itself,

bringing into force the new conditions for termination, as pro-

vided for in the treaty.
either Party may give notice to the
other Party of its intention to terminate
the treaty, in which case the treaty shall
terminate one year after such notice has
been given 24.

.

.

.

Two aspects of the present treaty have been the objects of

lengthy debate: the 'Far East' clause and prior consultation.

At issue in the first is the areas to which U.S. forces may be
legally sent from bases in Japan for combat or other military
purpose.

It is reasoned that U.S.

^ Ibid ~

p"!

24- ibid.

p

,

.

198.
199

troop activities may implicate

.
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vj3.p3.ri.

in situntions townrd which vJ3p3n would choose to remnin

neutrnl
J3p3n hss 3 legsl obligstion to 3id in U.S. defense efforts only on Jnpnnese soil, 3nd never in violntion of the

Jnpnnese Constitution.
'mutunl

'

The trenty, strictly spenking, is not

3S the title suggests.

obligntions

In return for unbnlnnced

however, the trenty stipulntes thnt the United

,

St3tes mny use bnses in Jnpnn "for the purposes of contributing
to the security of Jnpnn 3nd the mnintennnce of pence nnd

security in the Fnr Enst.

.

."

25

This nnd other clnuses of the

trenty, ns well ns the exchnnge of notes, presents n confusing

picture of the role of U.S. forces in Jnpnn nnd Enst As in,

which can be simplified to the following components:
1)

The U.S. can renct immedintely nnd by force to a
direct thrent to Jnpnnese territory. (Article V)

2)

The U.S. mny use bnses in Jnpnn to support improvements in the pence nnd security of the Fnr Enst, of
n non-combnt nnture, without mnndntory consultntion
with Jnpnnese lenders. (Article VI)

3)

4)

As long ns they contribute to the mnintennnce of
pence nnd security in the Fnr Enst, the U.S. mny
engnge in support nctivities of n non-combnt nnture
outside of the Fnr Enst. (interpretntion of Article
VI)

For any combnt nctivities in the Fnr Enst, of U.S.
forces stntioned in Jnpnn, prior consultntion must

^ Ibid

•

j

p.

198.

.
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be carried out with the Japanese government, (from
the exchange of diplomatic notes at the time the
treaty was signed)

The scope of the

'Far East'

is not determined by the treaty,

and inevitably interpretations vary.
It is in Japan's interests to limit the area within which

U.S. military actions may occur, in order to reduce the pos-

sibility of involvement in international disputes, which other-

wise would have no bearing on national security.

Attempts to

define the scope of the Far East have proved unsuccessful.
The United States has generally held to a broader interpreta-

tion than Japan, although in March, 1960 the Japanese governO£

ment declared that the scope of the Far East is vague.

Vietnam

is an example of a

°

military action, supported in

part by the activities of U.S. bases in Japan, which did not

directly endanger the security of Japan.

Because Japan was open

to charges of supporting the U.S. war effort, Japan's Foreign

Minister said, in 1967, that his country was "not neutral in the

Vietnam war." 27

U.S. involvement in controversial military ac-

tions originating from bases in Japan could endanger the Japanese

policy of maintaining good relations with all countries and lead
^byoung C. Kim, "Japan's Security Policy Debate," in Japan
ed. by Young C. Kim (Washington, D.C.:
in World Politics
Institute for Asian Studies, 1972), p. 63.
,

^7

Ibid.

,

p

.

66
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to a search for alternative methods of defense.

A key to future

Japanese defense policy will be the degree to which the U.S. use
of the Security Treaty is sensitive to Japanese interests.

The prior consultation principle established in Article
IV,

and confirmed in the subsequent exchange of notes, was

designed to protect Japanese sovereignty in the cases of major
changes in the deployment of U.S. forces in Japan or combat

operations using Japan-based forces.

The exchange of notes,

which specified the circumstances when consultation

is neces-

sary, is considered to carry the force of international law.

28

However, the use of the word ’consultation' instead of a stronger

word such as ’agreement' suggests the limited value of the clause
in actually ensuring Japanese control of combat operations

originating from within its boundaries.

In fact,

in the fifteen

years of its existence, during the period of U.S. involvement in
Indochina, the clause has not been invoked once.^

Although Japan fears being drawn into a conflict not its
own, there is also apprehension that the American defense com-

mitment has weakened.

The U.S. withdrawal of all forces from

Cambodia and Vietnam and unwillingness to offer more support in
the face of sure defeat, affected the Japanese faith in the
^^ Ibid ., p. 67.

29xhe New York Times, October 27, 1974.
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security treaty.

Criticism of the U.S. role in Indochina was

instantly changed to shock that the U.S. would no longer
defend
the nations it had made commitments to.

The analogy to Japan's

case was obvious, although Japan represents a more fundamental

interest to the U.S. than Vietnam ever did.

Nonetheless, even

before the fall of Saigon, Japanese officials were preparing
to ask Washington for a new commitment to Japan's defense. 30

The role of American public opinion in tempering the Viet-

nam policy was also an indication to Japan that even firm
promises by the U.S. Government might not be upheld in a time
of crisis.

A Gallup pole taken in 1971 and again in the spring

of 1975 indicates that there has not been a swing toward iso-

lationism during the past few years.

3^

However, Japan can take

little comfort from the finding that if Japan were attacked

only 16% of the sample would advise sending more troops to Japan.

Article V of the Security Treaty, which deals with the

heart of the American commitment to protect Japanese territory
from attack, specifies that each Party would act "in accordance

with its constitutional provisions and processes."

The 'pro-

cesses' refer to the Congressional role in the declaration of

of war.

Considering the Congress' reassertion of its war-

b^ The New Yorir~Times April 4, 1975.
3 The New York Times
May 11, 1975.
32"Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security," p. 198.
,

^-
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related powers and the newly established congressional limitations on a president's ability to wage war, it is natural for

Japan to wonder whether the United States could act swiftly and

decisively in the event of an attack on Japan.
The recognition of this concern has led to an American

effort to reassure its Asian allies, especially Japan and South
Korea, that the United States is to be trusted.

Secretary of

State Kissinger told the Japan Society that

we will permit no question to arise about
the firmness of our treaty commitments;
allies who seek our support will find us
constant ^3
.

A month later, in August 1975, a Prime Minister Miki-President
Ford summit meeting in Washington dealt primarily with the U.S.
role in Northeast Asia and the security treaty.

A joint an-

nouncement to the press'3 4 noted, among other things:
*

(1)

the

United States would uphold its treaty commitments in Asia,

(2)

the security treaty is an "indispensable element" of Asian

international politics, and (3) the United States will continue
to uphold the defense commitment to Japan.

Although the United

States has improved its credibility, U.S. actions will weigh

heavily on the evolution of Japanese defense policy.

If the

bb japan House "Newsletter , XXIII, No. 1 (1975), 4.
34 j a pan Times Weekly (International Edition), August 16,

1975.
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United States were to pull away from its defense commitment,
n military isolation
a proper defense

-

-

or the separation from the assurance of

could trigger a decision to rearm in force.

The conditions at the time the 1960 Security Treaty was

drafted no longer exist.

The Japanese themselves are more

self-confident and willing to deal with national problems
independently.

The idea of once again revising the treaty,

to more accurately reflect the prevailing conditions of 1975,

has taken root.

Prime Minister Miki has already outlined his

broader interpretation of the treaty.
The Japan-U.S. Treaty of Mutual Cooperation
and Security is, as its name evidences, the
basic charter governing cooperative relations
between the two countries. Hitherto, the
defense aspect of the treaty has tended to
come to the fore, but it is to be welcomed
that today, when the energy and food problems
have assumed such importance, mutual recognition has developed between the two countries
of its proper and natural significance as a
balanced treaty providing both for economic
and other cooperation on the one hand and
defense and security on the other.

The necessity and importance of the treaty in stabilizing
the East Asian area and securing the defense of Japan is recog-

nized by both Japan and the United States.

However, statements

such as the above suggest the direction in which interpretation

"Policy Speech by Prime Minister Takeo
1975 (special supplement), p. 2.

55 japan Report

Miki," March

1,

,
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of the treaty is directed.

Revision of the treaty in the next

decade to indicate more formally such sentiments is a distinct

possibility.

Nuclear Weapons and the NPT
The security treaty with the United States and Japan's

nuclear option are linked issues.

If Japan continues to reject

nuclear armament, there will have to be adequate assurances
from the United States that the treaty is meaningful and that
the U.S. deterrent is operative.

The need for the U.S. deter-

rent is still widely recognized in Japan,

frequently doubted than before.

^

although it is more

The question of whether the

United States would give up New York and Chicago for Tokyo and
Osaka is an oversimplification of the problem, but it does suggest the concerns of a nation completely dependent upon another
for ultimate security.

Could Japan establish its own nuclear deterrent?

There

are few proponents of such a policy at the present time, although
the desire for an autonomous defense not dependent on the deci-

sions of Americans could lead to more serious planning for this
If Japan set up a deterrent, at least a potential

option.

enemy would have to count on nuclear weapons being used in the
3b See Prime Minister Miki's comments on this subject in

Ibid

.

,

p

.

4.
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event of an attack, whereas now an enemy could gamble that
the
U.S. would not respond with nuclear weapons.

for nuclear weapons is international prestige.

A further rationale
The unfortunate

fact that the permanent members of the Security Council of the

United Nations are all nuclear nations is not unknown in Japan.
The previous line of reasoning has serious weaknesses.

From the standpoint of security, nuclear weapons simply would not
offer any advantages.

It is difficult to conceive of Japan set-

ting up an operative deterrent, given the geographical and demo-

graphic facts of the Japanese islands.

Japan is the sixth most

populous country and ranks third in the size of the economy.
However, most of the large industrial complexes and nearly one-

half the population are located in an area between Tokyo and
Osaka, which are only 300 miles apart.

To defend effectively

this region from nuclear attack, regardless of the sophistica-

tion of the technology used, would be impossible.
The technological aspects of developing nuclear weapons are

not insurmountable for a nation of Japan’s advanced development.
Japan became the fourth nation to orbit a satellite, although
the more difficult problems of guidance systems have yet to be

overcome.

Japan is completely dependent upon the import of

uranium, which comes from Canada, the U.S., Australia, and France.

A potential nuclear power would have to have guaranteed supplies
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of the materials necessary to produce nuclear weapons.

also lacks areas to test weapons.

Japan

Testing in the Pacific would

be prohibitive in diplomatic cost.

The legality of nuclear weapons for defensive purposes has

been established, surprisingly enough, by government documents
and official statements.

In 1967 Prime Minister Sato claimed

that defensive nuclear weapons would be legal. 37

ph e 1970

Defense White Paper, although reaffirming the policy of keeping

nuclear weapons out of Japan for the present, did confirm their
legality.
In the legal and theoretical sense, possession of small nuclear weapons, falling
within the minimum requirement for a capacity
necessary for self-defense and not posing a
threat of aggression to other countries, would
.38
be permissible.
.

.

.

.

Japan's nuclear policy contains the following components.
(1) Japan continues to rely on the

American deterrent, which

was confirmed in the August summit talks between Miki and
Ford. 39

The present nuclear policy, therefore, is that "going

nuclear is totally out of the question."^ 0
J/ Langdon,

(2)

Although Japan

Japan's Foreign Policy p. 139.
38Kunio Muraoka, Japanese Security and the United States
Adelphi Papers No. 95 (London: IISS, 1973), p. 24.
39 j ap an Report
"Japan-U.S. Announcement to the Press,"
September 1, 1975, p. 2.
4-Q japan Report
"Policy Speech by Prime Minister Mimi,"
,

,

,

p

.

4.

,
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continues to base its defense on the U.S. military alliance,
the option to develop nuclear weapons remains open.

(3)

Prime

Minister Miki claims to uphold the "three no" nuclear policy of
no manufacture, no possession, and no entry of nuclear weapons.
(4)

Japan continues to maintain a strong program of domestic

nuclear power production and has begun to manufacture nuclearpowered ships.
These elements of nuclear policy suggest no long-term

commitment to a single policy, but rather an interest in

keeping options open while professing no willingness at the
present time to alter the three no-nuclear principle.
The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) signed by Japan
in 1970 but not yet ratified, has taken on special importance

as the focus of Japan's nuclear decision.

Since Japan is an

important threshold state, able but not willing to manufacture

nuclear weapons and delivery systems, many nations, especially
those in Southeast Asia, China, the U.S. and the Soviet Union,

consider Japan's final action regarding the NPT to be a test
of the seriousness of the often repeated non-nuclear principles.

Becoming a party to the treaty is more of a symbol of non-

nuclear status than a permanent limitation of defense options.
Article 10 of the treaty stipulates that:

.
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Each Party shall in exercising its national
sovereignty have the right to withdraw from
the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary
events, related to the subject matter of this
treaty, have jeopardized the supreme interests
of its country. 1
Even so Japan has withheld ratification of the treaty pending
the resolution of several areas of concern to the Japanese

government

A Japanese statement issued at the signing of the NPT
elaborated the type of progress which would have to precede
final approval.

Although the treaty was designed to be a first

step to general nuclear disarmament, Japan is still concerned
that the present nuclear powers might use the NPT as a means of

consolidating their monopoly of nuclear weapons, without making
real efforts to stop the arms race.

security of non-nuclear states.

A related concern is the

Japan emphasized that if the

NPT were to have any effectiveness, the use of nuclear weapons
to threaten non-nuclear states must be dealt with.

The United

Nations Security Council Resolution 355, proposed by the three

nuclear-weapon nations who are parties to the NPT (U.S.,
Britain, U.S.S.R.) as a safeguard to non-nuclear nations, was
,

,

.

.42

acknowledged by Japan as a step in the right direction.

1,

4i"Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July
1968," in Hellmann, Japan and East Asia Appendix D. p. 211.
42 japan Times Weekly (International Edition), March 22,

1975.

,
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Another problem is the freedom to develop the
peaceful
uses of nuclear power.

Article

3

of the NPT calls for non-

nuclear weapon nations who become parties to the treaty
to be
subject to inspection safeguards by the International
Atomic

Energy Agency, to ensure the peaceful nature of nuclear
power
programs.

Japan is worried that the inspection arrangement

subject the nation

s

nuclear power program to unfair treat-

ment and that commercial secrets would be compromised by IAEA
inspectors. 43

Progress has been made on this issue, since,

in March 1975, Japan reached agreement with the IAEA on all

outstanding issues of inspection.
The Japanese decision on ratification of the NPT will also

be influenced by the decisions of other nations.

Japan would

feel less compulsion to become party to the treaty if other

nations most likely to develop nuclear weapons refused to take
part.

Of the fourteen nations considered threshold nuclear

powers,

^

India,

Israel, Pakistan, South Africa, and Spain), four are

eight are non- signatories (Argentina, Brazil, Chile,

43 shelton L. Wil 1 iams , Nuclear Nonproliferation in Inter national Politics: The Japanese Case The Social Science
Foundation and Graduate School of International Studies Monograph Series in World Affairs, IX, No. 3 (Denver: University
of Denver, 1972), p. 40.
^John Maddox, Prospects for Nuclear Proliferation
Adelphi Papers No. 113 (London: IISS, 1975), pp. 34-35.
,

,
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signatories but have not yet ratified (Egypt,
Indonesia, South
Korea, and Japan), and only two (Iran and Taiwan)
are full

parties to the NPT

.

Since inclusion of the nations which could

develop nuclear weapons is the object of the
NPT, the treaty
has not been effective.
In May 1974 India, a non-signatory nation, became
the sixth

nation to explode a nuclear device.
test expressed

An immediate Japanese pro-

regret because we have been and are still against

any nuclear test by any nation for any reason."^

The Indian

nuclear explosion was certainly a setback for the NPT and will
be a factor in Japanese ratification.

A further concern

is

that

France and China, both nuclear powers, declined to sign the
treaty.

Those who oppose ratification of the NPT cite the India

example as a reason for the futility of staying out of the

nuclear game.

It is argued that for Japan to foreclose its

right to develop nuclear weapons would be foolish, especially

given the important place in international affairs which Japan

now holds.

A leading proponent of the realist approach to

Japan’s international relations, reasons that nuclear weapons

will accompany the inevitable coming of age of a Japanese foreign
policy forced to face ’Realpolitik
4-^The

’

squarely.".

New York~Times, May 5, 1974.

.

.

The posses-

^
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s ion

of nuclear capabilities seems destined, to be a necessary

component for full and independent participation in inter-

^

national affairs. M<

There are, however, advantages in remaining outside of
the nuclear club.

Japan is now the object of close attention

by many nations having an interest in Japan's continued 'inno-

A type of reverse deterrence provides Japan with a

cence'.

weapon, for the decision to rearm is always available.

It

has been suggested that continued reluctance to ratify the NPT
is calculated to influence the nuclear policies of other

countries

.

A similar idea, "the power of holding back,"^

means that the threat of becoming a nuclear power can be turned
into an asset.

For Japan, the national goal of international prestige

can be realized without nuclear weapons, whereas the shock of
a militarily powerful Japan would be destabilizing to the

East Asian region and would work against the very purpose of

acquiring them.

Japan has a unique opportunity to achieve the

international prestige it seeks without the accoutrements of
former major powers.

What has been denounced as international

idealism is for Japan the most realistic means of achieving her
4-bpellmann , Japan and East Asia

,

p.

183.

47Richard Ellingworth, Japanese Economic Policies and
26.
Security Adelphi Papers No. 90 (London: IISS, 1972), p.
^ ^Hoffmann, Gulliver's Troubles, p. 45.
,
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aims.

This also suggests the uniqueness of Japan's present

position.

A combination of geography, history, economics and

culture presents Japan with an opportunity to be the 'great
experiment' in international politics.

friendly with

3.11

The need to remain

nations contributes to the realistic nature

of the option open to Japan.

The refusal to build the symbols

of international manhood, and instead to support international

cooperation, makes abundant sense given Japan's relationship
to the international system.

While addressing the United

Nations General Assembly in 1973, the Japanese Foreign Minister

pointed to the increasing weight of "deterrence by international

cooperation."^

This is the only kind of deterrence which makes

sense for Japan.
This is not to suggest that Japan will ignore the age-old

dictates of power politics.

The possibility of Japan going

nuclear "even if it doesn't make sense"^ is an indication of
the complex forces at work on the question of nuclear weapons.

The point here, however, is that on the basis of the external

setting

-

the continued reliance on the United States, the lack

of serious threats, the intense reaction which Japanese nuclear
49 Japan Report
"Excerpts from Statement by Masayoshi
Ohira, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Before U.N. General Assembly,"
October 16, 1973, p. 4.
50Emmerson, Arms Yen & Power p. 350.
,

,

,
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weapons would provoke, and the unique need to deal with all
nations

-

a non-nuclear Japan in a world of nuclear powers is

a realistic option for an emerging Japanese foreign policy.
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CHAPTER

VI

DEFINING A WORLD ROLE: THE LIMITS OF CHOICE
The Tanaka Foreign Policy

According to most analysts of Japanese foreign policy, the
decade of the 1970‘s was to be the period when Japan would de-

velop a new role in world politics more suited to its enhanced
position in a changing international system.

As the second

half of the decade begins, however, no clear pattern has emerged,
and Japan has yet to formulate a comprehensive set of principles
and policies establishing a basis for future relations with the

world.

The foreign policy during the Tanaka prime ministership

substantiates this observation.

Tanaka came to power at a time of increased flexibility in
international relations and strong domestic support for a shift
in foreign policy.

The Japanese Prime Minister initiated the

first ‘positivist''*' foreign policy in the post-war era, engaging
in eight major summit conference trips

-

talking with the lead-

iFor background on the 'positivism-passivism' foreign policy
debate in Japan, see Kei Wakaizumi, "Japan's Dilemma: To Act or
Not to Act," Foreign Policy No. 16 (Fall 1974), 30-47.
2(1) U.S.- September 1972, (2) P .R. C -September 1972, (3)
U.S. -August 1973, (4) West Germany, Britain, and France-October
1973, (5) U.S.S.R. -October 1973, (6) ASEAN- January 1974, (7)
Canada, Mexico, Brazil- September 1974, (8) Burma, New Zealand,
Austral ia-November 1974.
,

.
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ers of seventeen nations

-

in slightly more than two years.

His major foreign policy accomplishment was the normalization
of diplomatic relations with China.

Japanese foreign policy during this period, however, was

infrequently successful and often counterproductive.
that were set for the new diplomacy

-

Goals

development of a tri-

lateral relationship with the United States and Europe, im-

provement of relations with Southeast Asia, and conclusion of
a treaty with the Soviet Union - made little progress.

Tanaka

was met with indifference in Europe, intransigence in Moscow,
and riots in Southeast Asia, leaving relations with the latter

area at a post-war low.

The trip to the western hemisphere in

September, 1974 uncovered a growing Canadian skepticism of

Japanese economic policy and its fear of becoming "the new

Manchuria."

3

The summit talks in Washington have been unevent-

ful, although relations have improved since the 1971 series of

economic and diplomatic 'shocks', which rocked the Japanese-

American friendship.

No major proposals for Japanese partici-

pation in global affairs were discussed beyond hollow assertions of partnership.

The tendency of Japanese policy to bend

under pressure was not altered by the appearance of a more
active foreign policy, as evidenced by the negotiations with
3fhe New York Times, September 29, 1974.

.

133

China for an aviation agreement, the inclusion of the 'hegemony'
clause in the 1972 Joint Statement, and the reversed Middle East
policy.

The Tanaka foreign policy showed no signs of being able

to stand firm in the midst of political confrontation with other

nations

Although the Tanaka foreign policy marked a shift to a new
activism, the diplomatic efforts lacked an underlying foundation

other than 'resources diplomacy,
to resource-holding nations.

'

a phrase particularly galling

Tanaka never defined the basis of

support for Japan's ventures into world politics and soon found
out that concrete results were not easily obtained.

The newly

active diplomacy created confusion in the world and disappoint-

ment at home.

It was piecemeal, designed to cure specific

problems as they arose; it reflected no international philosophy.

Resources diplomacy alone could not create a stable basis
on which Japan could enter the world more actively.

The obser-

vation that "economic power has become, in the eyes of the
world, political power"^ suggests that Japan must recognize the

larger political impact of economic negotiations.

Politics and

economics can no longer be separated.
"Japan's Legacy and Destiny of Change,"
XLVIII, No. 1 (1969), 30.

9-Riichi Aichi,

Foreign Affairs

,

.
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Japan's foreign policy continues to be reactive,
shaped

by external events and the changing international
environment.
The positivist diplomatic stance of recent years does not
mean
that Japan was any less dependent upon outside constraints or

any more able to carry out an independent foreign policy.

Even the Tanaka summit diplomacy was triggered originally by
two external events

-

the Nixon trip to Peking and the oil

crisis
The Tanaka foreign policy indicates that the process of

defining a new Japanese position in international relations
has made little progress.

International politics remain in

New problems affecting the whole world

flux.

-

rich and poor

-

defy solution, and the aftermath of old problems, such as
Indochina, only adds uncertainty to what is to come.

these circumstances Japan is reluctant

ficult

-

-

Under

and finds it very dif-

to develop a new and comprehensive approach to guide

its foreign policy, especially since this approach will be

shaped more by the international system which emerges than

vice versa

.

Japan in World Politics

Japan fits none of the standard molds used to categorize
nations.

The limitations upon Japan's acquiring the status of
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superpower, polar power, or regional power were described in

earlier chapters.

Neutrality is also ruled out by Japan's

interaction with its surroundings.

Japan is affected by and

affects other nations to such a degree that a politically

responsible foreign policy is necessary to balance the extensive economic interdependence with the rest of the world.

The

dilemma of Japanese foreign policy is to find a position which

assimilates both the need to maintain a relatively low profile,
in light of extreme economic and military vulnerability, and

the need to deal constructively with issues which demand

definite political choices, such as development aid strategies
for developing nations.

Japan must avoid both abrasive policy

on the one hand and an irresponsible lack of policy on the other.

Two general observations concerning Japan's place in world

politics serve to narrow further the range of foreign policy
choice.

The first is that Japan's relationship to the inter-

national system is unique, consisting of a combination of
factors unprecedented in world politics.

The implication is

that a new pattern of international activity, replacing the

standard models listed above, is required to accommodate a
future international role for Japan.
in
The imbalance between the extensive economic position
is the basis of
the world and negligible military significance
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Japan's uniqueness.

Other nations have avoided a military

role, but never has a nation of such importance to the world,
in this case a nation with the third largest economy, not

chosen to develop corresponding political and military power.
Furthermore, this economic giant can be hurt by the decisions
of any number of resource-holding nations.

Japan has entered the world on a massive scale, but is

ill-equipped to fulfill the accompanying responsibilities on
the basis of customary notions of power.

The 'great experiment'

to develop as an economic power without the traditional sources

of military power suggests an irregular pattern of interna-

tional activity.

This paper concludes that the 'great experi-

ment' is not only plausible, but that Japan would meet powerful

constraints by attempting to act as a traditional world power.
The unique nature of Japan's position in world politics is

also evident in the second general observation, namely, that

Japan is a nation without any consistent source of diplomatic
support, even the U.S., and therefore is in an isolated position in international politics as well.

dilemma of Japanese foreign policy.

This is the fundamental

It stems from the impera-

tives of the economy which direct Japan to promote an 'unprincipled'

foreign policy, more practical than ideological, the

core of which is the separation of politics from economics.

A

.
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Foreign Ministry White Paper written during the
Sato prime

ministership recognized that Japan had little choice but
to
promote, first, its relations with all other countries
so as
to enable it to conduct a dialogue with any of them."~^

The

succeeding administration continued to voice this policy in
the form of what Foreign Minister Miyazawa calls 'diversified

diplomacy', "aimed at strengthening its friendly relations with

other countries of the world, including those with different
fl

political systems."
The policy of friendship with all nations, however, pre-

cludes the development of close relations with one group.

For

example, Japan backed away from participation in ASPAC as soon
as it became evident that the regional organization was de-

signed to confront the People's Republic of China.

Japan must

cultivate the broad spectrum of diplomatic relations rather
than participate in more limited groups of nations, with similar interests and common international goals, from which diplo-

matic support could be derived.

Japan has many acquaintances

but no partners.
3 Japan

p

.

Institute of International Affairs, White Papers

,

35

Report "Policy Speech by Foreign Minister Kiichi
Miyazawa," March 1, 1975 (special supplement), p. 5.
6 Japan

,

7
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Although Japan purposely diversifies her relations, there
is a danger of being among all the major groups in the
world

and a member of none.

This problem stems from Japan's middle

position between North and South, and East and West.

In South-

east Asia, Japan is linked with a Western group of industri-

alized nations; in Western Europe, Japan is a threatening

Asian power.

Japan has no natural position in a region, eco-

nomic group, or ideological association.
no natural ally.

In fact, Japan has

The notion of a Japan in a middle position

helps to explain present policies and future possibilities.

For a middle -man there is always the question
of identity - whom do you want to identify
with, what do you want to be, and what do you
want to achieve? To handle such problems,
middle-men start developing a life style and
way of looking at the world which may be built
on things like unsecurity and anxiety, trying
to do one's best within a given situation, and
trying to take low postures, because one of the
things that middle-men don't want to be is
visible
.

Japan is a nation apart and therefore visible.

Japan will have

to consider ways of integrating the nation's economic needs

with the interests of other nations in order to play a constructive part in international affairs.

Diversified diplomacy

/United States Trade Council, Communication: The Key to
U.S.- Japan Understanding, a symposium for the International
Business Communities of the Western United States (Washington,
D.C.: The United States- Japan Trade Council, 1973), p. 6.
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is

necessary to guarantee the continued health of the economy.

It becomes dangerous, however,

if carried out without a broader

pattern of consensus among nations, and without an expanded
Japanese world-view, no longer restricted to economic matters.

Internationalism
Japan does not face the same diplomatic dangers when

working within international organizations.

International

forums cannot create a favorable atmosphere in which the

divisions of the world at large do not appear.

The voting

blocks in the General Assembly of the United Nations reflect
the North- South cleavage, which must also be faced in a bi-

lateral context.

However, a multilateral format offers Japan

the opportunity to think and act globally

-

which it must

without being a true global power, which it cannot be.

-

Since

Japan has a vital interest in a stable world political system,
international organization and a more general philosophy of

internationalism offer the best opportunity to work for that
goal.

Peace for Japan is synonymous with peace in the world.
By taking major diplomatic initiatives in a multilateral

context, Japan can avoid the pitfalls of her isolated position

and take advantage of its unusual middle— man role.

By linking

an international posture to a multilateral approach, Japan can
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afford to play a positive part in finding the solutions to
global problems, with a minimum danger to its diversified
relations, and with insulation from bilateral political rivalries.

Furthermore, the problems Japan is most concerned about

can no longer be solved through bilateral diplomacy.

The

global economic structure, energy, trade, and disarmament, for
example, are of a technical nature and require the participation of many nations to negotiate fundamental solutions.

Japan

has already established its effectiveness in multilateral

negotiations and has a successful history of participation in
international organizations.

Cooperation in supporting and strengthening the United
Nations has been a constant theme of Japanese foreign policy.
In 1973 $10 million was donated to lower the UN deficit, as
Q

well as $100 million for the United Nations University Fund.
The UN subsequently decided to accept Japan's offer to place
the headquarters of the United Nations University in Japan.

Since the UN is the only international organization which is

global, general-purpose, and neutral, the extent to which Japan
is able to play a leading role in its functions

permanent member of the Security Council

-

-

perhaps as a

will affect the

«Kei Wakaizumi, "Tanaka's Approach to Summit Diplomacy,"
Pacific Community, V, No. 2 (1974), 285-86.
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extent to which internationalism becomes a salient feature
of
Japan's foreign policy.
An international organization, however, is a forum, not
a philosophy.

It offers a framework for negotiation and co-

operation, but does not determine national policy.

Also the

pursuit of a foreign policy based on a set of principles of
international cooperation cannot be successful by relying solely
on an international organization like the UN.

On the contrary,

the success of a national policy of internationalism lies in a

particular relationship between a nation and its external context, such that the policy of internationalism is conducive
to the achievement of national goals.

Japan's unique position

in international society demonstrates convincingly that inter-

nationalism would not be a fanciful diplomatic gesture, but a
pragmatic approach to the requisites of domestic and foreign
policy.
The world role Japan chooses is bounded by the extent of
its compatibility with basic principles of international co-

operation.

For Japan, internationalism would not represent a

shirking of the political responsibilities

bom

of economic

power, but would provide an opportunity to define political

goals clearly for the world to understand.

On the basis of

of
the external foreign policy setting, Japan has the option
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turning more seriously toward internationalism and becoming a

new type of world leader whose diplomatic base

is the councils

of the world, whose diplomatic credo is diversity tempered by

interdependence, and whose international role as diplomatic

broker would generate its own political currency.

s
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